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PRICE FORMATION IN MULTIPLE, SIMULTANEOUS CONTINUOUS DOUBLE
AUCTIONS, WITH IMPLICATIONS FOR ASSET PRICING1
Elena Asparouhovaa, Peter Bossaertsb,2 and John Ledyardc
We propose a Marshallian model for price and allocation adjustments in par-
allel continuous double auctions. Agents quote prices that they expect will max-
imize local utility improvements. The process generates Pareto optimal alloca-
tions in the limit. In experiments designed to induce CAPM equilibrium, price
and allocation dynamics are in line with the model’s predictions. Walrasian ag-
gregate excess demands do not provide additional predictive power. We identify,
theoretically and empirically, a portfolio that is closer to mean-variance optimal
throughout equilibration. This portfolio can serve as a benchmark for asset re-
turns even if markets are not in equilibrium, unlike the market portfolio, which
only works at equilibrium. The theory also has implications for momentum, vol-
ume and liquidity.
Keywords: Continuous Double Auction, Walrasian Equilibrium, Marshallian
Equilibration, Experimental Economics, Asset Pricing.
1. INTRODUCTION
General equilibrium has become the widely accepted theoretical model for competitive
markets and the benchmark against which those markets are empirically evaluated. A
compelling reason to be interested in equilibrium is the “argument, familiar from Marshall,
... that there are forces at work in any actual economy that tend to drive an economy
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2toward an equilibrium if it is not in equilibrium already.”1
While there is wide consensus as to the appropriate equilibrium model, there is little
consensus as to the “forces at work.” Many models have been proposed, but none have been
accepted as the appropriate canonical model. How the equilibrium prices and allocations
are attained, and how, if at all, trading occurs out of equilibrium, remains to be discovered.
The lack of a consensus model of the forces that drive an economy towards equilibrium is
a problem for applied economics, including policy analyses. If an inappropriate model is
used in the design of economic policy, outcomes will not be as intended.
Until recently, attempts to settle this question have been mostly theoretical in nature2
with no real evidence or philosophical foundation available to help sort the sensible from
the inane. Traditional empirical analyses of markets shed no light on the processes because
they do not have access to the fundamentals. But, with the advent and development of
experimental economics, it is now possible to explore the forces that drive equilibrium.
The market organization we focus on in this paper is the continuous double auction
(CDA) where individuals can submit bids (to buy) or asks (to sell) at any price, and
whenever the highest bid is at a price at or above the lowest ask, a trade takes place
immediately. In modern instances of the double auction, called the open-book system,
bids and asks that are surpassed by more competitive orders (bids at a higher price or
asks at a lower price) remain available, unless cancelled. The open book system is the
preferred exchange mechanism of financial markets around the world, and in particular,
of stock exchanges (NYSE, Euronext, LSE, NASDAQ, etc.). Recent advancements have
been proposed where instead of immediate execution, there is a small interval over which
orders accumulate in the book, called Frequent Batch Auctions (Budish, Cramton, and
Shim, 2015). The model we propose also applies to those mechanisms.
It is well known from the experimental analyses of CDA markets (summarized in Crock-
ett, 2013) that, in the first period of these experiments, (1) competitive equilibrium is not
reached immediately – there is a process of adjustment – and (2) prices follow neither
the Walrasian tatonnement (whereby prices react to aggregate excess demands, but allo-
1Arrow and Hurwicz (1958), p. 263.
2Exceptions that study multiple simultaneous markets include the works of Plott (2001), Anderson, e.a.
(2004) and Gillen e.a. (2020). These works report (price) dynamics that are in line with those reported
here, as discussed later.
3cations are not adjusted) nor any of the various extant non-tatonnement theories (where
allocations can also change). If the fundamentals and markets are repeated for additional
periods, then (3) prices and allocations converge to their general equilibrium values and
(4) between-period price changes follow the Walrasian tatonnement.
In this paper, we present a theory that explains the paths of prices and allocations
within the first few periods of market experiments, before beliefs of likely paths could
reasonably have been formed, and hence, where bets on their nature are pure speculation.
It deserves emphasis that we model the paths of allocations as well as the paths of prices.
The extant literature tends to focus only on price dynamics (Crockett, 2013).
There are three main assumptions underlying the theory. First, in the spirit of Marshall
(1890), quantity moves to those offering the highest surplus to the market. Second, indi-
viduals quote prices that maximize their local utility gains taking the rules of engagement
as given. Third, agents do not speculate, which means that they do not perceive drift in
terms of trade that could improve their eventual allocations by postponing or accelerating
transactions. Under these assumptions, the resulting offers are a convex combination of
agents’ marginal valuations and the prices.
The analysis is not on each bilateral trade separately as traditional CDA would require.
Instead it invokes local market clearing,3 defined as the transaction prices that cause
net trades to sum to zero. In this sense, our model is more appropriate for the recently
suggested frequent batch market mechanism (Budish, Cramton, and Shim, 2015).
Our theory is related to that of Friedman (1979), which itself follows up on the work
of Smale (1976). Friedman identifies a process where allocations move in a Marshallian
fashion: throughout, prices are a weighted average of individuals’ willingness-to-pay. Fried-
man (1979) focuses on stability and shows that the process converges to a Pareto-optimal
allocation. However, the model misses detail on how offers are generated and how offers
lead to trade. That is what our theory delivers.
Our theory is also related to that in Smith (1965) (see also Inoua and Smith, 2020).
Smith shows that bids of many agents have an impact on prices and trades, not just
those of the marginal agents, as in neoclassical accounts of Marshallian price adjustment
(Samuelson, 1947). Our theory shares this prediction. In contrast to Smith’s analysis,
3The local clearing prices are equal to the average of all offers.
4however, bids in our theory do not derive from Walrasian demand (or supply) functions.
Instead, they result from agents’ attempts to maximize local utility gains from trade.
To show the theory’s power, we apply it to asset markets. It has a particularly intuitive
appeal in the case of quasi-linear utility functions like mean-variance utility functions.
Quasi-linear preferences naturally apply to the finance application of general equilibrium:
the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) and its multi-factor generalizations (Roll, 1977).
We confront the finance application with data from nine experimental sessions, each with
6 to 8 replications (“periods”) with varying parametrizations. The results provide strong
support for the predictions regarding price and allocation dynamics. We test whether tra-
ditional Walrasian aggregate excess demands explain the remainder. We find that they do
not. That is, Walrasian adjustment theory predicts neither price nor allocation dynamics.
The theory has important implications for empirical asset pricing, where for decades the
concern has been to identify one mean-variance efficient portfolio, or a number of “factor
portfolios” that add up to this efficient portfolio.4 We find that price dynamics push one
particular portfolio towards mean-variance efficiency throughout equilibration. Unlike in
CAPM (equilibrium), it is not the market portfolio, but a risk-aversion weighted endow-
ment portfolio. We refer to it as the Risk-Aversion Scaled Endowment Portfolio (RASE).
In the experiments, we demonstrate that the RASE portfolio generates significantly higher
average reward-to-risk ratios (Sharpe ratios) than the market portfolio.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The model setup and the theoretical results
are presented in Section 2. Experimental methods are discussed in Section 3. Results are
reported in Section 4. Implications for empirical asset pricing are in 5. Section 6 concludes.
2. TWO MODELS OF MARKET DYNAMICS
2.1. Preliminaries
2.1.1. The Economic Exchange Environment
Our analysis is done within the context of the standard model of pure exchange. There
are I consumers, indexed by i = 1, . . . , I. There are K = 1 + R commodities, where the
last R commodities are indexed by k = 1, . . . , R, and the first is indexed by 0. We reserve
4See (Fama and French, 2004). Since the set of mean-variance optimal portfolios is spanned by two
portfolios, one of which necessarily is the risk-free security, it suffices to identify one additional mean-
variance optimal portfolio to describe the entire set. See Roll (1977).
5this first commodity as a special one, and will designate it as the numeraire when needed.
Each individual i owns initial endowments ωi = (ωi0, . . . , ωiR), ωik > 0 for all i and k.
xi = (si, ri1 . . . , r
i
R) is the allocation of i. si is i’s quantity of the numeraire commodity.
X i = {(si, ri) ∈ <K | ri ≥ 0} is the admissible consumption set for i.5 Each i has a
quasi-concave utility function, ui(x). We assume that ui ∈ C2 (that is, ui has continuous
second derivatives) although many of our results would hold under weaker conditions. We
also assume that {x|ui(x) ≥ ui(ωi)} ⊂ Interior(X i) and ui0 = ∂u
i(xi)
∂xi0
> 0,∀xi ∈ X i, ∀i.
2.1.2. Time and the Continuous Double Auction
In a CDA experiment, traders begin with an endowment of commodities, ωi. They
proceed to make bids and offers over time. Often these are retained in a public book
unless the trader decides to withdraw their bid or offer. A bid or offer in the book can be
accepted by anyone. If accepted, trade occurs at that price. This goes on until a stopping
rule is implemented. Although the CDA operates in continuous time, the intuition behind
the theory is easier to understand in discrete time. Time is divided into discrete intervals
of length ∆. With slight abuse of notation, the interval t is [t, t+ ∆). xit = (sit, rit) denotes
i’s holdings at the beginning of interval t. Trade takes place and the change in i’s holdings
during interval t is ∆xit = (∆sit,∆rit) = (sit+∆ − sit, rit+∆ − rit). pt = (1, qt) ∈ <K+ is the
vector of K prices at which trades take place in interval t.
2.2. The Walrasian Model
Here we describe the standard Walrasian model of market dynamics as well as the
variants known as non-tatonnement processes. There is nothing new here. We include this
only as a reminder to the reader.
Given a price vector p ∈ <K+ , the individual excess demand function of i is ei(p, ωi) =
arg maxdi u
i(ωi + di) subject to p · di = 0 and ωi + di ∈ X i. The aggregate excess demand
of the economy is E(p, ω) =
∑
i e
i(p, ωi), where ω = (ω1, ω2, ..., ωI).
Definition 1 A price p∗ and an allocation x∗ = (x∗1, . . . , x∗I) constitute a competitive
equilibrium at ω = (ω1, . . . , ωI) if and only if
1. Given prices p∗, the allocations x∗i are optimal: x∗i = ei(p∗, ωi) + ωi,∀i, and
5There is no lower bound on the numeraire.
62. Markets clear; that is, E(p∗, ω) = 0.
By Walras’ law, we can limit our attention to the excess demands of all but the nu-
meraire commodity, denoted ei(p, ωi) and E(p, ω), respectively. Also, since the price of
the numeraire is fixed at 1, individual and aggregate excess demands can be written as
ei(q, ωi) and E(q, ω), respectively, where p = (1, q).
In Walrasian adjustment models, the main force driving price changes is the taton-
nement. Prices of goods in excess demand (supply) go up (down). Let B be an R × R
diagonal matrix with positive diagonal elements. The Walrasian tatonnement is:
qt+∆ − qt
∆
= BE(qt, ω)(2.1)
xit =
 ωi if E(qt, ω) 6= 0ei(qt, ωi) + ωi if E(qt, ω) = 0(2.2)
The tatonnement is really only a model of prices since trades do not occur until prices
have converged to their equilibrium values. (2.2) is not what is going on in most continuous
markets where trading occurs as prices are changing.6 Recognizing that, researchers have
proposed many alternatives under the heading of Non-Tatonnement (NT) processes.7
An NT process works as follows. At the beginning of each time interval, agents know their
individual holdings, xit. Trade takes place during the interval at prices pt. The holdings at
the end of the interval are xit+∆. A new price is computed based on the excess demands
at the price pt and the holdings xt. The Walrasian non-tatonnement dynamics are:
qt+∆ − qt
∆
= BE(qt, xt)(2.3)
xit+∆ − xit
∆
= gi(qt, x
i
t),(2.4)
where gi is a vector function,
∑
i g
i(qt, x
i
t) = 0, that also satisfies the Lipshitz condition.
Different NT models impose different additional assumptions on the functions gi, see
6The tatonnement might describe, for example, the “book building” process in a call market if orders
can be withdrawn (Plott and Pogorelskiy, 2017).
7See e.g. Negishi (1962), Uzawa (1962), Hahn and Negishi (1962).
7Negishi (1962). In the CDA, there is no Walrasian auctioneer to set prices. There, (2.3)
is interpreted as a predictive theory of prices: it predicts the price changes at t+ ∆ based
on prices and allocations at t.
2.2.1. A Problem
In most multi-market CDA experiments, competitive equilibrium does not occur instan-
taneously except, perhaps, with replication in later periods. In addition, neither taton-
nement, nor non-tatonnement dynamics fit the data.8 A better theory is needed.
2.3. ABL Market Dynamics
Here, we describe a model based on Marshall’s intuition but with a consistent micro-
foundation. The model rests on four key hypotheses. The first captures the Marshallian
intuition that quantity moves to those individuals offering higher surplus to the
market. Let bit = (bi1,t, ..., biR,t) be i’s bid during the interval t. bik,t is i’s stated willingness
to pay (accept) to buy (sell) a unit of k in terms of the numeraire commodity 0.
Hypothesis 1 Marshallian Trading
∆rit (= r
i
t+∆ − rit) = A(bit − qt), i = 1, ..., I(2.5)
where A is an R×R positive diagonal matrix and Akk = αk, k = 1, ..., R.
In some markets, aggressive bidding attracts larger volume than in others. In this sense,
αk is a liquidity parameter. It is assumed that it does not vary over time.
The next two hypotheses are almost always requirements of a CDA system.
Hypothesis 2 Instant Settlement (Payment with numeraire occurs at each trade)
∆sit = −qt ·∆rit i = 1, ..., I.(2.6)
8See Asparouhova, Bossaerts and Plott (2003), Anderson, e.a. (2004), Asparouhova and Bossaerts
(2009), Gillen e.a. (2020), and Crockett (2013).
8Hypothesis 3 Feasible Trading (Whatever is bought, is sold)
I∑
i=1
∆rit = 0.(2.7)
The last hypothesis, Hypothesis 4, specifies how individual traders determine their bids
in a continuous double auction. It captures the idea that agents only consider small trades
and do not speculate. Faced with the fact that large orders will move prices unfavorably,
intractable strategic uncertainty, and a lack of futures markets and rational expectations,
agents make only small (local) adjustments to their holdings. This can be mo-
tivated using game theory, but it is also a fact in field markets.9 Faced with uncertainty
about where prices will go next, agents do not speculate. They take current prices as
given.
To motivate Hypothesis 4, assume traders only consider small local adjustments that
maximize their gain in local utility ∆uit. For very small ∆, ∆uit ≈ ∇ui(xit) · (∆sit,∆rit)
where ∇ui(xit) is the gradient of ui at xit. Under Hypotheses 1 and 2, the change in i’s
utility that results from a bid bit at time t will be:
∆uit ≈ ui0(xit)(ρi(xit)− qt) ·∆rit = ui0(xit)(ρi(xit)− qt) · A(bit − qt),
where ρik(xi) denotes the marginal rate of substitution between commodities 0 and k
for k = 1, ..., R if i’s holdings are xi.10 ρik represents i’s marginal willingness to pay
(or be paid) for units of k in units of commodity 0. ρi(xi) = (ρi1(xi), ..., ρiR(xi)) and
∇ui(xit) = ui0(xit)(1, ρi(xit)).
To locally optimize, i wants to choose bit so that the direction of change of xit = (sit, rit)
is proportional to the gradient. This means they want A(bit− qt) = ci∆(ρi(xit)− qt), where
the parameter ci is a characteristic of i. It determines the step size and rate of trading.
Larger ci imply a greater urgency to trade. We call this i’s impatience parameter and
9Financial markets have become more competitive, and trade sizes have decreased dramatically. “Split-
ting orders” has become an important concern in algorithmic trading. See Avellaneda, Reed and Stoikov
(2011). Further empirical evidence that trade takes place “in smalls” can be found in O’Hara, Yao and
Ye (2014). In a market with continuous order submission and trading, the small-orders assumption can
easily be justified theoretically; see Rostek and Weretka (2015).
10ρik(x
i) =
∂ui(xi)/∂xik
∂ui(xi)/∂xi0
.
9assume it does not change over time.
Remark 1 This behavior is incentive compatible in the following sense. If both the quan-
tity adjustment rule, Hypothesis 1, and the price setting rule, Hypothesis 3, are known and
taken as given, and αk = α, for k = 1, ..., R, then there are (c1, ..., cI) such that the bids
derived above are a local Nash equilibrium.11
The final intuition behind Hypothesis 4 concerns the timing of information and actions.
When an agent computes their bid at the start of interval t, they do not know qt. They
only know the prices and allocations at the end of the t−∆ interval. Because ∆ is assumed
to be very small, it is likely that bids at t are based on the prices and allocations arrived
at in the interval t−∆.
Hypothesis 4 Local Optimization and Lagged Prices
bit = qt−∆ + c
i∆A−1(ρi(xit)− qt−∆),∀i,∀t > 0.
For the curious, Section B.1 of the Appendix contains a discussion of the model and its
implications when qt is used in place of qt−∆ in Hypothesis 4. That model implies that
bids and prices are simultaneously determined in the time ∆. The model is not consistent
with the data, as explained in Appendix B.2.
This leaves the initial price, q0, to be specified. The initial price is likely context-
dependent and can plausibly equal the vector of mean payoffs in an asset pricing setup, be
related to prices in the previous period when applied to replications of the same situation,
or be equal to the average of the values of the initial endowments.
Hypothesis 5 The initial price q0 is some arbitrary positive vector.
In our empirical analysis, the focus will be on price changes, so Hypothesis 5 is never in
play.
Hypotheses 1-5 are the ABL model.
Remark 2 We have assumed that agents do not speculate. The beginning of an analysis
under speculation can be found in Appendix C. Speculation becomes an important concern
11This is similar to a result of Roberts (1979). A proof is provided in section A.1 of the Appendix.
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in later replications in an experiment, when these replications are identical, meaning par-
ticipants have the opportunity to form beliefs about likely price dynamics. Here, we focus
on early replications, or replications with varying parametrizations.
The dynamics of the ABL model are straightforward. Entering interval t, consumer i
has an allocation xit = (sit, rit) and knows the price from the previous interval qt−∆. In the
interval, bids are formed based on Hypothesis 4 and trade occurs at new prices based on
Hypotheses 1-3. Prices adjust rapidly to ensure that trading, according to Hypothesis 1
and 2, adds up to zero (Hypothesis 3). Leaving the interval, trader i now owns xit+∆ =
(sit+∆, r
i
t+∆) and knows the prices qt. This process, given the initial price q0, is formalized
in equations (2.8)-(2.10).12
rit+∆ = r
i
t + ∆
(−c¯(ρ¯t − qt−∆) + ci(ρit − qt−∆))(2.8)
sit+∆ = st − qt · (rit+∆ − rit)(2.9)
qt = qt−∆ + c¯∆A−1(ρ¯t − qt−∆)(2.10)
where c¯ =
∑
i c
i
I
and ρ¯(xt) =
∑
i c
iρi(xit)∑
i c
i .
The limiting behavior of the dynamics is most easily seen in continuous time.13 Dividing
(2.8) and (2.10) by ∆ and letting ∆→ 0, we get the continuous time version, for t > 0:14
drit
dt
= ci(ρit − qt)− c¯(ρ¯t − qt),∀t > 0(2.11)
dsit
dt
= −qt ·
(
(ci(ρit − qt)− c¯(ρ¯t − qt)
)
,∀t > 0(2.12)
dqt
dt
= −c¯A−1(qt − ρ¯t),∀t > 0(2.13)
Remark 3 When taking limits, one important subtlety of the ABL model is lost. The
discrete-time equations specify dynamics over two intervals: [t − ∆, t) and [t, t + ∆). In
continuous-time, everything collapses effectively to one interval. E.g., in discrete time,
price changes over [t − ∆, t) depend on marginal rates of substitution at the end of the
12See Appendix A.2 for details.
13Convergence in continuous time implies that if step sizes, ci, are not too large, then there will also
be convergence in discrete time.
14See Appendix A.3 for details.
11
interval (i.e., at t); see (2.10). In continuous time, it does not matter whether marginal
rates of substitution are based on holdings at the beginning or end of an interval, because
adjustment is smooth. To preserve discrete-time subtleties, one could add random shocks
to the adjustment, and appeal to Itô calculus. Limit (Itô) processes are not smooth (time
series are nowhere differentiable with respect to time). Consequently, timing subtleties
from discrete time are retained in continuous time. As reported in Section 4 below, the
discrete-time subtleties matter empirically. Price changes within observation intervals in
our trading sessions are driven by holdings at the end of each such interval, as predicted
by the ABL model. The Walrasian model, in contrast, predicts that price changes are based
on (excess demands computed from) lagged holdings. The Walrasian model fails if only
because of timing issues. Timing is an under-appreciated dimension in which Marshallian
and Walrasian dynamics differ. In Marshallian dynamics, prices are determined by current
willingness to pay; in Walrasian dynamics, prices are determined by past excess demands.
This subtle but important difference in the models will be crucial for our empirical work.
There is an analogy to the First Welfare Theorem of General Equilibrium Theory: the
allocation at any rest point is a Pareto-optimal allocation. By the Second Welfare Theorem
the rest point is also a competitive equilibrium at that allocation. If there are no income
effects, the continuous process (2.11)-(2.13) will converge to a rest point from any initial
price and allocation. This may not be true for the discrete process (2.8)-(2.10) if step sizes
are too large.
Theorem 1 Convergence to Pareto Optimal Allocations15
If (i) there are no income effects, i.e., ui0(xi) = 1 for all i and all xi ∈ X, and (ii)
rit > 0 for all t, then for the dynamics in (2.11) - (2.13), (xt, pt) → (x∗, p∗) where x∗ is
Pareto-optimal and (p∗, x∗) is a competitive equilibrium at x∗.
Remark 4 Along the path generated by (2.11) - (2.13), it is possible that duit/dt < 0.
With the bidding lag, duit/dt = ui0,t ((ρi(xit)− qt) · ci(ρi(xit)− qt)−
∑
k(ρ
i
k(x
i
t)− qk,t)αk(dqk,t/dt))
While the first term is non-negative, the second term is not necessarily so. Traders basing
their bids on lagged prices do not anticipate and cannot protect themselves from “ex post”
15The proof of this theorem is relegated to Section A.4 of the Appendix.
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adverse trades. For example, if prices are rising fast, slow agents may trade into increasing
prices when they want to buy.
Remark 5 The possibility that duit/dt < 0 (among other differences) distinguishes the
ABL theory from Friedman (1979) and Smale (1976). Specifically, our allocation dynamics
do not satisfy Friedman’s condition (P).
2.4. Comparing Walrasian vs. ABL Dynamics
The Walrasian and ABL models can imply significantly different paths of price adjust-
ment. This can be seen in the simple example in Figure 1. There R = 1 and I = 2, utility
functions are quasi-linear (the inverse demand functions therefore equal the marginal rates
of substitution ρ), and the aggregate endowment is W = r1t−∆ + r2t−∆ = r1t + r2t . We mea-
sure the holding of trader 2 from right to left starting at W . The competitive equilibrium
allocation and the resting point of the ABL model occur where ρ1 and ρ2 cross, with qe
denoting the equilibrium price.
In Figure 1, r1t−∆ denotes 1’s holdings at (t−∆), while 2 holds r2t−∆ = W − r1t−∆. The
most recent price, qt−∆, is below the equilibrium price. At the given holdings, and given
the most recent price, there is excess demand for the good (at qt−∆, individual 2 demands
3 units, and 1 demands more than W units) so the Walrasian model requires the price
to increase, i.e., qt − qt−∆ > 0. To determine the sign of qt − qt−∆, the ABL model uses
the allocations at t, r1t and r2t . Given small changes in quantities, these allocations will be
close to r1t−∆ and r2t−∆, as depicted by the vertical band. As a result, the average weighted
marginal rate of substitution, ρ∗t = ρ¯(rt), falling in the corresponding horizontal band, is
lower than the price qt−∆ meaning the ABL model predicts that the price would fall, i.e.,
qt − qt−∆ < 0.
The difference in the implications of the two models when R > 1 is also very stark
if we restrict attention to a very special environment: the Capital Asset Pricing Model
(CAPM). The CAPM is theoretically simple and is of its own interest since it serves as
the foundation of both asset market experiments and empirical analyses on historical data
from the field. In the CAPM, all utility functions are of the form:
ui(xi) = si + µ · ri − (ai/2)(ri) · (Ωri),(2.14)
13
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Figure 1: MRS (Marginal Rate of Substitution ρi) in a 2-commodity, 2-person economy, as a
function of holdings of agent 1. Equilibrium price equals qe. Last traded price equals qt−∆. The
Walrasian equilibration model predicts that the price will increase because, at qt−∆, there is
excess demand: agent 2 demands three units and agent 1 demands more than W units, while
total supply equals only W units. In contrast, ABL predicts that the price will decrease, to ρ∗t ,
which equals the average of the ρis at current holdings.
where µ is an R-dimensional vector of positive constants, Ω is an R×R positive-definite
matrix of constants, and ai is a positive scalar constant. In asset pricing models, µ is
interpreted as the expected payoff of an asset, Ω is the payoff covariance matrix across
the assets, and ai is a measure of risk aversion. For these utility functions,
ρi(xi) = µ− aiΩri and ei(q, xi) = 1
ai
Ω−1(µ− q)− ri.(2.15)
Combining (2.15) with (2.10) yields:16
qt − qt−∆
∆
= A−1Ω
∑
ciaiei(qt−∆, xit)
I
(2.16)
Comparing (2.16) with (2.3), we can see three fundamental differences between the
16See section D of the Appendix for the details of the derivation.
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price dynamics of the ABL model and those of the Walrasian model in the CAPM envi-
ronment.17
1. Cross-Security Effects Emerge. In the ABL model, changes in the price of com-
modity k depend not only on the excess demand for k (as in the Walrasian model)
but also on the excess demand of the other commodities. For example, if the off-
diagonal entries of Ω are negative (indicating the commodities are complements),18
the excess demand for j 6= k puts upward pressure on the price of k. This means
that the price of k could increase, even though there is an excess supply of it. This
cannot happen under Walrasian price dynamics.
2. Heterogeneity in Risk Aversion, Impatience and Liquidity Matters. In the
ABL model the excess demand functions of traders with higher aici are weighted
more heavily in how they affect the changes in prices. The desires of the more risk
averse and the more impatient thus have a larger impact on price changes. In the
Walrasian model it is the less risk averse who have a larger impact on price changes.
3. Timing Is Different. See Remark 3. In the Walrasian model, prices in interval t
are determined by prices and allocations in period t−∆. In the ABL model, prices
in period t are determined by prices in period t−∆ and by allocations in period t.
The three differences are testable in the lab and motivate the design of our experiment.
As to allocation dynamics, using (2.15), the following system of difference equations
describes agent-level changes in allocations:
rit+∆ − rit
∆
= −Ω
(
ciairit −
∑
ciairit
I
)
+
(
ci − c¯) (µ− qt−∆)(2.17)
In ABL, the changes in an agent’s allocations depend on (i) how far impatience and
risk-aversion scaled holdings are from the average impatience and risk-aversion scaled
holdings, plus (ii) the differences between expected payoffs and lagged market prices,
provided the agent’s impatience is different from the average. The second term disappears
if impatience is the same across agents; the first term remains under equal impatience, as
long as risk aversion is heterogeneous. The covariance matrix pre-multiplies the first term.
17The premultiplication by Ω of the excess demands might remind some of the Newton-Raphson algo-
rithm. We discuss this in section E of the Appendix.
18A similar analysis applies when the commodities are substitutes or when there is a mix of both.
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As a consequence, ABL predicts cross-security effects in allocation dynamics in the same
way it predicts them in price dynamics. The effects are opposite for prices and allocations
however, because of the negative sign in front of the first term of (2.17).
Equations (2.16) and (2.17) will form the basis of our empirical analysis.
3. EXPERIMENTAL METHODS
3.1. Framework
Our experimental design builds on the CAPM. Agents have mean-variance preferences
with fixed risk-to-reward trade-offs, and hence, no wealth effects. Prior experiments have
shown robust convergence to equilibrium; see Asparouhova, Bossaerts and Plott (2003);
Bossaerts and Plott (2004) and Bossaerts, Plott and Zame (2007).
CAPM predicts that, in equilibrium, one particular portfolio is mean-variance optimal.
This portfolio is the market portfolio. In CAPM, agents’ total demands (holdings plus
excess demands) are the same for all agents, up to a constant of proportionality equal to
the inverse of risk aversion. This is obtained by rewriting (2.15):
rit + e
i(qt, x
i
t) =
1
ai
Ω−1(µ− qt).(3.1)
The property is known as “portfolio separation.” As a result, in the Walrasian equilibrium,
the right-hand-side must equal to the total supply of assets, i.e., the “market portfolio.”
The market portfolio is defined as the per-capita endowment portfolio of risky assets, with
holdings equal to r = 1
I
∑I
i=1 r
i. Consequently this means that, in equilibrium, the market
portfolio must be mean-variance optimal, for otherwise it would not be proportional to
agents’ demands. See Roll (1977).
Equilibrium prices are as follows.19
(3.2) q∗ = µ− 11
I
∑
i
1
ai
Ωr.
In the laboratory, CAPM works well; see, e.g., Bossaerts and Plott (2004); Bossaerts,
19It is straightforward to check that, at these prices, the sum of the individual excess demands (3.1)
equals zero, and hence, markets equilibrate. When converted to restrictions on returns (payoffs divided by
prices), the equation becomes the well-known requirement that expected returns in excess of the risk-free
rate be proportional to the covariance of returns with those on the market portfolio.
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Plott and Zame (2007). Here is an example, from a classroom session in an advanced
investments class at the University of Melbourne. Forty-eight students were asked to
trade to maximize their payoffs given by (2.14), with ai = 0.01, for all i,
µ =
[
5 5 5
]
and Ω =

16 −5 −14
−5 16 9
−14 9 16
 .
Notice that mean-variance preferences are induced by asking students to directly optimize
the CAPM payoff function. In the sequel, we will nevertheless refer to µ as the vector of
expected payoffs, and Ω as the covariance matrix.
The three securities had equal expected payoffs and equal variances. But in equilibrium
prices differ because (i) supplies were unequal, with the third security being in the shortest
supply and (ii) the first security had negatively correlated payoffs with the others, while
the other two had positively correlated payoffs. Equilibrium prices were:
q∗ =
[
5.125 1.5 3.5
]
.
The equilibrium price of the third security is not the highest even if it is in the shortest
supply. The intuition is simple: the first security, with the highest equilibrium price, is more
valuable because its payoff is negatively correlated with that of the others. Participants
were not told the per-capita supplies. Hence, even if they knew CAPM, they could not
possibly compute equilibrium prices.20
Trade in this sample laboratory market took place in an online continuous open-book
trading platform (called Flex-E-Markets21). Participants could submit limit orders for any
of the securities for the duration of the class exercise (about 35 minutes). Participants were
provided with a tool that evaluated the performance of their current portfolios as well as
the net performance of any trades they wished to make.
Figure 2 displays the evolution of trade prices, during the first replication, of the three
risky securities (referred to as Stock A, Stock B and Stock C). Prices convincingly evolved
20The results of a quick poll before trading confirmed that most participants expected prices to be
equal).
21See http://www.adhocmarkets.com.
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from expected values to equilibrium levels.22
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Figure 2: Transaction prices (in cents) during a class experiment. Forty-eight participants traded
three risky securities (“Stocks” A, B and C) with known, equal payoff distributions but different,
unknown total supplies. Predicted equilibrium prices, in cents: 513 (A; blue), 150 (B; orange)
and 350 (C; grey).
Participants were divided into three groups based on their initial portfolio allocations.
They only knew their own allocation. The first group started with 15 of the first security
and none of the other securities; the second group started with allocations of 9, 20 and 0,
and the third group started with 0, 10, and 18. In equilibrium, they should all end up with
the same allocation, since they all faced the same risk aversion parameter. Final allocations
necessarily equal the market portfolio. Figure 3 plots the evolution of the difference of the
per-capita holdings of Group 1 and the market portfolio, over intervals of 5 trades each.
The figure shows how per-capita holdings gradually move towards the equilibrium level.
Notice that the evolution is far more gradual than the price evolution.
In the class experiment, we induced mean-variance preferences, by tying performance
directly to the CAPM utility function in (2.14). There was no explicit uncertainty in
the experiment; performance (payoffs) were immediate once allocations were known. We
could also have drawn payoffs from distributions with mean µ and covariance matrix Ω,
but then we would not have controlled the risk aversion parameter, so we could not have
unambiguously derived equilibrium price levels. In addition, we would have to make the
22We were agnostic as to the price levels markets would start from; see Hypothesis 5. In the experiment,
prices started from expected value. That is, q0 = µ.
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Figure 3: Evolution of differences between (i) per-capita holdings of A (blue), B (orange) and
C (grey) of the first group of participants, and (ii) the market portfolio. Initial holdings are 15
units of A each and 0 of B and C. The market portfolio consisted of (per capita) 8 units of A,
10 of B and 6 of C. Differences converge to zero, implying that per-capita holdings converged to
CAPM predictions. Time is measured in intervals of 5 transactions.
auxiliary assumption that mean-variance preferences explain choices in the experiment.23
As with the classroom experiment presented above, the experimental sessions we ran
to test the theory of this paper also relied on induction of mean-variance preferences. To
simplify the setup, the experiments had two, not three, risky securities.24 Also, since the
theory has predictions for economies with heterogeneous risk aversion, we varied the risk
aversion coefficient across subjects.
3.2. Hypotheses
The theory makes precise predictions about the evolution of prices as well as allocations.
Allocation changes depend on risk aversion and are therefore analyzed as average changes
in holdings across subjects who belong to homogeneous groups. Groups are defined by
initial allocations and/or risk aversion coefficients. The parameters µ and Ω in the payoff
23When introducing uncertainty explicitly, Bossaerts and Plott (2004) and Bossaerts, Plott and Zame
(2007) show that mean-variance preferences provide only a crude approximation of individual choices,
even if CAPM accurately predicts prices.
24Appendix F.2 reports results from earlier sessions with three risky securities, but where mean-variance
preferences were not induced.
19
functions are the same regardless of group.
Prices
For the mean-variance utility functions in (2.14), individual marginal willingness to
pay is ρi(xi) = µ − aiΩri, while risk-aversion weighted average willingness to pay is
ρ¯(x) = µ − Ω
∑
i a
iciri∑
i c
i . Hence, the price dynamics implied by our model ABL, in discrete
time, are given by the equation qt− qt−∆ = c¯∆A−1
(
µ−Ω
∑
i a
icirit∑
i c
i − qt−∆
)
. See Appendix
D, Equation D.1. In the sequel, we set ∆ = 1.
Since we would like to compare this to the Walrasian model (2.3), we want to write it
in terms of excess demand functions, as in (2.16):25
qt+1 − qt = 1
I
A−1Ω
(∑
i
aiciei(qt, x
i
t+1)
)
.(3.3)
The equations summarize the price dynamics under ABL. They constitute the key hy-
pothesis which we test on the data. They link changes in prices to Walrasian excess
demands. As discussed in the theory section, there are three unusual aspects compared to
the traditional Walrasian adjustment model. We repeat them here for convenience.
1. The covariance matrix Ω pre-multiplies the vector of risk-aversion weighted ex-
cess demands. This means that the excess demand of one security determines price
changes of all other securities, and the effect is proportional to the corresponding
payoff covariances.
2. Excess demands are weighted by risk aversion, liquidity and impatience parameters.
In our experiments, the liquidity and impatience parameters will not be controlled,
so we will assume that they are the same for everyone.26
3. Excess demands are evaluated at end-of-period holdings, unlike in the Walrasian
model (2.3). We already emphasized this subtle difference in timing between the
two models; see Remark 3.
In the empirical tests, we will pay close attention to these three features. To directly
25Equation (2.16) specifies price changes over period t − ∆ while Equation (3.3) does the same over
period t.
26There is evidence that impatience relates to risk aversion, however: see Asparouhova and Bossaerts
(2009). We will return to the issue in the Results section; see the discussion concerning Figure 7.
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test the first feature, we pre-multiply the vector of risk-aversion weighted excess demands
by the covariance matrix, so that cross-security effects are no longer present. That is, we
run the following multi-equation regression:
(3.4) qt+1 − qt = B WE(qt, {xit+1, all i}) + t,
where WE
(
qt, {xit+1, all i}
)
= Ω
(
1
I
∑
i a
iei(qt, x
i
t+1)
)
.
The main restriction is that the coefficient matrix B is diagonal. We cannot say much
about the magnitude of the diagonal coefficients except that they should be strictly positive.
In (3.4), an error term t is added, to reflect noise in the dynamics. In the empirical analysis
constant terms will also be added. These will be period-specific if the data straddle multiple
periods.27
Let us illustrate the regressions in (3.4) using the class experiment. Figure 4 displays
scatter plots of price changes and the regressors. Price changes were computed over inter-
vals of five transactions. The vertical axes in the figure reproduce the price changes from
Figure 2, over intervals of five trades. The horizontal axes display the regressors in (3.4),
also calculated every five trades. The prediction is that there is a positive relationship
between price changes of a security i (= A, B, C) only for regressors WE(i). That is, the
relation is (strictly) positive only for the plots on the diagonal, where observations are
plotted in red. No relationship should exist in plots off the diagonal, where observations
are plotted in blue. Visual inspection suggests that this is indeed the case. A formal test
of the hypothesis is provided above each of the plots. Displayed is the magnitude of the
estimated slope coefficient, as well as the corresponding z-statistic. z-statistics beyond
2 can be considered “significant” (p = 0.02). Slope coefficients are estimated using Hu-
ber’s robust regression with δ = 2.0.28 Consistent with the theoretical predictions, slope
coefficients on the diagonal are all significant, while none in the off-diagonal plots are.
Walrasian dynamics are different. From (2.3), the price-change regressions for the Wal-
27The constant term plays no role in the theory, but may be needed empirically to avoid model mis-
specification. If our model does not explain everything in the data (as one should expect), imposing zero
intercepts can lead to serious biases in the estimation of slope coefficients, and hence, mis-interpretation
of the findings.
28Huber’s robust regression uses a loss function that treats outliers differently compared to least squares.
With parameter δ, the loss function is defined as: L() = 2/2 if || ≤ δ, and L() = δ(||−δ/2) otherwise.
In Figure 4, δ = 2.
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Figure 4: Scatter plots of price changes over intervals of five (5) trades against regressors
in (3.4). Estimates of regression slopes (using Huber’s robust regression) and correspond-
ing z-statistics are indicated on top of each plot. The ABL model predicts that the plots
with red observations should generate a strictly positive slope, while the remaining plots
should have zero slopes. The results are consistent with the ABL model (using p = 0.02).
Number of observations per plot: 101.
rasian model are as follows:
(3.5) qt+1 − qt = BW E(qt, {xit, all i}) + t,
where E(qt, {xit, all i}) = 1I
∑
i e
i(qt, x
i
t).
Notice the absence of weighting in computing the total excess demands, and the dif-
ference in timing of holdings when evaluating excess demands. Also, under Walrasian
dynamics, the matrix BW should be diagonal with strictly positive diagonal coefficients.
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Rather than running two separate regressions, we test whether the Walrasian model
provides additional explanatory power beyond the ABL model. We do so by including a
security’s own excess demand E(qt, {rit, all i}) as a regressor in the corresponding equation
of the ABL model (3.4). To avoid issues of multicolinearity, we orthogonalize the regressors
of the Walrasian model with respect to the ABL regressors.29 We then test whether the
coefficients of the orthogonalized Walrasian excess demands are significant and positive.
If so, the Walrasian model is deemed to provide explanatory power for price changes
beyond the ABL model. If the coefficients are insignificant or negative, we conclude that
the Walrasian model either does not provide explanatory power beyond the ABL model
or makes the wrong predictions.
Allocations
The equations in (2.17) specify the evolution of holdings of risky assets under the ABL
model. We set ∆ = 1, as for price dynamics, and assume equal impatience parameters
(ci = c¯). The latter implies that the second term drops out. We are left with:
rit+1 − rit =− c¯Ω
(
airit −
∑
i a
irit
I
)
.(3.6)
To interpret these equations, remember that i’s willingness to pay is ρi(xi) = µ − aiΩri.
Therefore, (3.6) states that agents’ allocations change in proportion to their willingness
to pay relative to that of the average agent. This translates into the following predictions.
1. Allocations, scaled for risk aversion, change depending on how far an agent’s current
holdings deviate from per-capita holdings, scaled for risk aversion.
2. Cross-security effects : if holdings in one security deviate from risk-aversion scaled
per-capita holdings, then this affects subsequent changes in holdings of other secu-
rities. The effects depend on payoff covariances.
As to the second point, if an agent holds too much of a security (scaled for risk aversion)
29Orthogonalization is implemented by taking the difference between E and WE. Inspection of the
resulting regressors reveals that the orthogonalized regressors equals the differences between the risk-
aversion weighted per-capita holdings of a security and the unweighted per-capita holdings. The latter
equals the number of units of the security in the market portfolio, i.e., the corresponding element in r¯.
Orthogonalization has at least one important effect. While Walrasian aggregate excess demands are not
affected by the distribution of holdings across participants with different risk aversion, the orthogonalized
Walrasian aggregate excess demands are, since the regressors in the orthogonalization, the ABL regressors,
change with the distribution of holdings.
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relative to the risk-aversion weighted average holdings, and another security has payoffs
with positive correlation, the agent will reduce holdings of the other security as well.
The scaling of an agent’s holdings by risk aversion has its origin in the fact that a risk
averse agent (an agent with high ai) will always invest less in risky securities. Portfolio
separation predicts how much less: the ratio of investments in a risky security of an agent
relative to the average agent is described entirely by the ratio of the agent’s risk aversion
coefficient and the average risk aversion coefficient.30 As such, portfolio separation is the
crucial driver of allocation dynamics in the ABL model.
Risk-aversion scaled per-capita holdings provide a crucial benchmark in ABL allocation
dynamics. Because of its importance we shall refer to them with an acronym: RASE, for
Risk-Aversion Scaled Endowment portfolio. The number of units RASE invests in each
security are collected in the vector
∑
i a
iri
I
. Compare this to the market portfolio, which
in general features different investments:
∑
i r
i
I
. We discuss later that the RASE portfolio
provides predictions for the cross-section of prices of risky securities that are analogous
to those of the market portfolio. The difference is that the predictions of the RASE
portfolio hold off equilibrium as well. The market portfolio makes valid predictions only
in equilibrium.
By adding error terms to (3.6), we translate the equations into regressions that we can
bring to the data:
(3.7) rit+1 − rit = B WDeltaRASE(t) + t,
where WDeltaRASE(t) = Ω
(
airit −
∑
i a
iri
I
)
.
Tests focus on the elements of the coefficient matrix B. The matrix should be diagonal,
with strictly negative diagonal elements. From an econometric point of view, however, the
regression in (3.7) is problematic. Figure 3 displayed the evolution of deviations of average
holdings of a group of participants from a benchmark (the market portfolio). The figure
shows that the deviations are highly persistent. We expect this persistence to emerge in
the regressors in (3.7) as well. Specifically, we expect the dynamics of the regressors to be
close to unit-root. This induces huge autocorrelation in the error terms, which then causes
significant biases in coefficient estimation, and mis-specification of standard errors. To
30This can readily be derived from Equation (3.1).
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avoid these issues, we therefore take first-differences. Investigation of the autocorrelation
of error terms indicates that this was the right strategy.
We do not run allocation regressions on each participant separately. Instead, as we did
for Figure 3, we average holdings across a homogeneous group of participants. A group is
defined by (i) the risk aversion parameter of its members, and (ii) their initial allocations.
Setting ∆
We have set ∆ = 1. What does this mean practically? Is one (time) tick equal to one
trade? Or, in calendar time, one second? The theory only assumes that ∆ is long enough
for everyone to trade, no matter how little. In practice, some participants trade only
occasionally, and others trade a lot. Indivisibility makes it unprofitable for many to trade
over very short intervals. As compromise, we measure time in terms of trades, not seconds,
and take one time step to be equal to five trades. That is, ∆ = 5 trades. This is rather
arbitrary, but reflects our intent to minimize bias while retaining power.31
3.3. Experimental Design
We report results from nine sessions with two risky securities and one risk-free security.
Like cash in the experiments, the risk-free security did not earn interest. Because it could
be sold short, it allowed participants to borrow money, at an interest set by the market.32
The first four sessions entailed two sets of four periods (for a total of eight). Treatments
were distinguished by the sign of the covariances between the payoffs of the risky securities.
Within a treatment, the four (4) periods were identical and independent replications,
starting with the same initial endowments and the same mean-variance payoff functions.
There were three groups of participants: one with a high coefficient of risk aversion, the
other two with low coefficients of risk aversion. Table I lists the parameters of the four
sessions. The table also reports CAPM equilibrium price predictions.
In the last five sessions, the sign and magnitude of payoff covariances were fixed for
three periods. Hence, there were two treatments of three periods each. In contrast to the
earlier sessions, initial endowments varied across the three periods within a treatment.
31Shorter time intervals lead to biases towards finding no effect from the regressors, and longer time
intervals cause lack of power because of reduced data points. We ran robustness tests and found the
inference to be unchanged when ∆ was set to 10 trades; power was reduced, however.
32For readers unfamiliar with markets experiments, Appendix F.1 briefly explains how they are run.
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As a result, CAPM equilibrium price predictions changed across all periods. Participants
were divided into two groups depending on their coefficient of risk aversion (high; low).
Table I lists the parameters for the first four sessions.33 Corresponding CAPM equi-
librium price predictions are included as well.34 Trade took place in online, anonymous,
continuous open book systems. These systems are an expanded version of the traditional
CDA whereby inferior limit orders are kept in an open book, until executed, or until can-
celed. In the first four sessions, the online system was Marketscape, developed by Charles
Plott at Caltech.35 In the subsequent five sessions, the online trading system was Flex-E-
Markets, the same system used for the class experiment discussed earlier. Flex-E-Markets
was originally developed by Peter Bossaerts and Elena Asparouhova, and now augmented
by Jan Nielsen. Flex-E-Markets is available for use as a Software as a Service (Saas)
through adhocmarkets.com.36
Participants were given a color-coded look-up table that, for every combination of hold-
ings of the two securities (A and B) indicated their performance (utility) excluding payoffs
from holdings of risk-free securities (“Notes”) and cash. See Appendix H for a full set of
instructions.
Participants were not informed of performance schedules or initial holdings of others.
This way, those with knowledge of general equilibrium theory could not possibly derive
equilibrium prices. This also means that participants could not form reasonable expecta-
tions about where prices would tend to, rendering credibility to the assumption of Local
Optimization (Hypothesis 4). The number of participants fluctuated between 18 and 41,
which is high relative to other market experiments. Earlier studies have suggested that,
with multiple simultaneous markets, more than the usual number of participants (8-10)
are needed in order for general equilibrium to emerge convincingly (Bossaerts and Plott,
2004).
In Sessions 1-4, accounting was done in an experimental currency converted to dollars
at the end of a session at a pre-announced exchange rate. In the remaining sessions,
33The parameters for the sessions 5-9 can be found in Appendix G Table IV.
34In some of the periods in the sessions listed in Table IV, exchange took place with a one-shot call
market. We exclude those periods since our theory does not apply to this exchange mechanism.
35Marketscape was also used in, e.g., Asparouhova, Bossaerts and Plott (2003); Bossaerts, Plott and
Zame (2007).
36Flex-E-Markets provided the trading interface for the experiments reported in, e.g., Asparouhova and
Bossaerts (2017); Asparouhova e.a. (2016).
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Session Securities Risk Av.
011128 A B (ai)
Subjects (#):
Type 0 (14) 8 2 0.028
Type 1 (14) 2 8 0.015
Type 2 (13) 2 8 0.23
Securities:
Market (Units) 4.05 5.95
Exp Payoff ($) 2.30 2.00
Pay Variance 1.0 0.14
Periods 1-4:
Pay Covariance -0.3
CAPM Price 2.24 2.01
Periods 5-8:
Pay Covariance 0.3
CAPM Price 2.14 1.94
Session Securities Risk Av.
020320 A B (ai)
Subjects (#):
Type 0 (10) 8 2 0.028
Type 1 (10) 2 8 0.015
Type 2 (10) 2 8 0.23
Securities:
Market (Units) 3 4
Exp Payoff ($) 2.30 2.00
Pay Variance 1.0 0.14
Periods 1-4:
Pay Covariance 0.3
CAPM Price 2.14 1.94
Periods 5-8:
Pay Covariance -0.3
CAPM Price 2.24 2.01
Session Securities Risk Av.
020424 A B (ai)
Subjects (#):
Type 0 (13) 8 2 0.028
Type 1 (13) 2 8 0.015
Type 2 (14) 2 8 0.23
Securities:
Market (Units) 3.95 6.05
Exp Payoff ($) 2.30 2.00
Pay Variance 1.0 0.14
Periods 1-4:
Pay Covariance 0.3
CAPM Price 2.13 1.94
Periods 5-8:
Pay Covariance -0.3
CAPM Price 2.24 2.01
Session Securities Risk Av.
020528 A B (ai)
Subjects (#):
Type 0 (13) 8 2 0.028
Type 1 (13) 2 8 0.015
Type 2 (14) 2 8 0.23
Securities:
Market (Units) 3.95 6.05
Exp Payoff ($) 2.30 2.00
Pay Variance 1.0 0.14
Periods 1-4:
Pay Covariance 0.3
CAPM Price 2.13 1.94
Periods 5-8:
Pay Covariance -0.3
CAPM Price 2.24 2.01
TABLE I
Parameters: Session 1-4. An experimental currency was used, converted to U.S. dollars
at a pre-announced exchange rates. All parameters are expressed for 100 units of
experimental currency. Type 0, Type 1 , and Type 2 subjects all had initial allocation
of 0 Notes and 4.0 of Cash.
all accounting was done in U.S. cents. Sessions lasted approximately three hours and the
average payoff was $45 (with range between $5 and $150). The experiments were approved
by the Caltech and University of Utah Institutional Review Boards (ethics committees).
Instructions with snapshots of the MarketScape and Flex-E-Markets trading interfaces
can be found in Appendix H.
3.4. Statistical Analysis
We perform regression analysis based on equations (3.4), (3.5) and (3.7). To study the
slope coefficients, we report z-statistics based on robust regressions using Huber’s method,
with outlier parameter (δ) equal to 2.0 throughout, as explained before.37
37We implement Huber’s robust regression using the method “robustfit” of the Matlab statistics package.
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Our data consist of price and allocation records for 2 securities in 9 experimental sessions
and 2 treatments within each session, for a total of 36 samples/time series. Rather than
reporting 36 z-statistics separately for each sample,38 we report the distribution of the 36
z estimates. Under the null hypothesis that the corresponding parameter equals zero, the
distribution should be N(0, 1) (standard normal). The ability to use the entire empirical
distribution of statistics across multiple samples is a luxury that experimental replications
afford. For an earlier implementation of this approach, see Bossaerts, Plott and Zame
(2007).
Under the alternative hypothesis (when the slope is non-zero), the z-statistics should
continue to be Gaussian with unit variance, but with non-zero mean. The sizes of the
effects under the alternative hypothesis could vary from one outcome to another, being
governed by cohort-specific parameters such as the impatience and liquidity parameters.
Hence, under the alternative hypothesis, we expect that, across sessions/treatments, the
z-statistics behave as a Gaussian random variable with a random mean. That is, the z-
statistic is a mixing Gaussian random variable with mixing on the mean. This implies
that the distribution will still be Gaussian, but with variance larger than 1. See Figure 5,
Left Panel.
The approach facilitates diagnostics on the correctness of the standard errors with which
the z-statistics are constructed. If the standard errors are computed incorrectly, one could
reasonably expect the z-statistics to be Gaussian with a standard deviation different
from 1. The standard deviation may even depend on the sample (outcome) at hand.
Consequently, the resulting distribution of z-statistics becomes a mixture-of-normals, with
mixing on the standard deviation. This is well known to generate leptokurtosis: a density
with excessive peaks and tails relative to the Gaussian distribution. See Figure 5, Right
Panel. Consequently, leptokurtosis in the estimated density of the z-statistics will reveal
mis-specification of the model with which standard errors are computed.
We estimate the density of the z-statistics using standard kernel smoothing techniques.39
38Example: there are 36 z-statistics that test whether the diagonals in the coefficient matrix of (3.4)
equal zero. Another example: there are 36 z-statistics that test whether the slopes on the orthogonalized
Walrasian excess demands [see (3.5)] provide no additional explanatory power for price changes beyond
the regressors in (3.4).
39We use the ksdensity method in the statistics package of Matlab.
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Figure 5: Left Panel: Under the ABL model, the true diagonal elements of the regression matrix
B in (3.4) depend on parameters that are cohort and/or security specific, such as impatience and
liquidity. As a result, while the corresponding z-statistics will still have unit variance (asymptot-
ically), their mean changes randomly across the 36 time series. The unconditional distribution,
shown to the right, will still be Gaussian, however. Right Panel: If z-statistics are computed
using the wrong standard errors, and the standard errors are random across the 36 time series,
the resulting unconditional distribution of z-statistics will be more peaked and exhibit heavier
tails than the Gaussian distribution. Leptokurtosis therefore reveals model mis-specification.
4. RESULTS
4.1. Prices
Diagonal Elements of B in 3.4. Figure 6a plots the 36 estimated z-statistics for the di-
agonal elements of the coefficient matrix in projections of price changes onto risk-aversion
weighted excess demands pre-multiplied by the payoff covariance matrix. These are the
diagonal elements of B in (3.4). There are 36 observations since there are 36 samples
(time series), one for each of 2 assets per session-treatment, and for each of 18 session-
treatments.40 The 36 observations are depicted by stems on the horizontal axis of the
plot. Under the null that the ABL model does not predict price changes, and provided
the usual assumption for (asymptotic) gaussianity of the z-statistics is satisfied, the den-
sity of the z-statistics is N(0, 1), as indicated by the solid black curve. According to our
theory, however, the diagonal elements of B should be strictly positive. As is clear from
the figure, all 36 estimated z-statistics are positive. Their mean is indicated by the value
of z where the red-dotted line reaches its peak. At more than 5, this mean is in the tails
40As mentioned before, a treatment consists of replications (periods) within a session with the same
payoff covariance matrix but not necessarily the same initial allocations.
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of the density of the z-statistics under the null, with a p value that is less than 10−6. On
these two accounts, we find strong confirmation of the theory.
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Figure 6: Plot of 36 estimated z-statistics (stems) corresponding to diagonal (left) and
off-diagonal (right) elements of the coefficient matrix B in (3.4). All transaction price
changes over intervals of five (5) trades for a security in one session-treatment constitute a
sample from which a single z-statistic is estimated. Solid red curve depicts kernel-estimated
density of the z-statistics. Dotted red curve depicts Gaussian curve centered at the mean
z-statistic and assuming unit variance; this is the theoretical curve under the alternative
of a non-zero coefficient, centered at the observed mean, and assuming equal impatience
and liquidity parameters across securities/sessions/treatments. Solid black curve depicts
N(0, 1), the theoretical density under the null that the coefficients are zero.
The solid red line in Figure 6a displays the estimated density of the z-statistics. It is to
be compared to the red dotted line, which represents the density centered at the mean z-
statistic, and with variance equal to 1. This means that the red dotted line represents the
distribution of the z-statistic under an alternative hypothesis whereby the true value of the
diagonal coefficient is constant. The fact that the estimated density is flatter reveals that
the true value of the diagonal coefficients varies across outcomes. This is not surprising
since the true value depends on liquidity and impatience parameters which can be expected
to vary across subject cohorts and securities. As a result, and if the standard errors were
correctly specified, the true distribution of the z-statistic is Gaussian, with strictly positive
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mean. That is, the density should look like the red curve in Figure 5 of the Methods
Section. Notice also that the estimated density (the solid red line) displays the typical
bell shape of a Gaussian distribution. Disregarding slight positive skewness, the red curve
in Figure 6a looks Gaussian.
Off-Diagonal Elements of B in 3.4. According to our theory, the off-diagonal elements
of the coefficient matrix B in (3.4) should be zero. This reflects the fact that, once risk-
aversion weighted excess demands are adjusted for the covariance matrix, cross-security
effects should disappear. Figure 6b presents the evidence. The 36 estimated z-statistics
of the off-diagonal coefficients are clearly clustered around zero, though there are a few
large, negative outliers. The estimated density of the z-statistics (solid red line) overlaps
substantially with the theoretical density under the null hypothesis (solid black line).
The peak (mode) of the estimated density is close to zero (though negative). The mean
estimated z-statistic, indicated by the peak of the dotted red density, is much further
to the left, but still comfortably above -2 (the chance of observing an outcome of -2 or
less under the null is approximately 2%). The outliers cause left-skewness in the density
of the estimated z-statistics, which pushes the mean downward. With the exception of
the negative skewness, the estimated density of the z-statistics (red curve) appears to be
bell-shaped, suggesting that the z-statistics are well-specified.
Walrasian Dynamics: Diagonal Elements of BW .We now turn to Walrasian influence
on price dynamics. We determine to what extent price changes that are not captured
by the ABL model can be explained by traditional Walrasian excess demands. That is,
we compute z-statistics for the diagonal elements of the coefficient matrix BW in 3.5,
after orthogonalizing the regressors with respect to the regressors in the ABL model
(i.e., the regressors in 3.4). Figure 7 displays the resulting 36 estimated z-statistics. They
are mostly clustered around zero, consistent with the hypothesis that Walrasian dynamics
cannot explain anything beyond Marshallian dynamics. There is one big (negative) outlier,
beyond -5. The estimated density of the z-statistics (solid red curve) mostly coincides with
the density under the null (solid black curve), though the left tail is a bit larger because
of the outlier. The former has a mode close to 0, consistent with the null. If we look at the
theoretical density centered at the sample mean z-statistic (dotted red curve), we observe
that it is displaced to the left, which is again the influence of the outlier. We conclude
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that the preponderance of evidence points towards inability of Walrasian excess demands
to provide explanatory power that is not already captured by the ABL model.
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Figure 7: Plot of 36 estimated z-statistics (stems) corresponding to diagonal elements of the
coefficient matrix BW in (3.5); regressors are orthogonalized with respect to regressors in (3.4).
See caption of Figure 6a for further information.
We emphasize that the negative outlier, and indeed all significantly negative outcomes,
are inconsistent with Walrasian dynamics. If Walrasian dynamics truly explained some of
the variance of price changes left unexplained by our theory, the test statistics should be
positive. The vast majority are negative instead.
To better understand the meaning of the – often negative – z-statistics for the Walrasian
excess demands, we plot them against (i) the estimated z-statistics corresponding to the
diagonal elements of the coefficient matrix in the ABL model (the matrix B), and (ii) the
estimated z-statistics corresponding to the off-diagonal elements of the same matrix.
Figure 8a plots the former. We observe a mild (p = 0.05) negative relationship. This
means that, if we find a stronger positive influence of “driver” of a security’s price according
to the ABL model, we tend to find it offset by a negative influence of the security’s own
Walrasian excess demand.
But the latter has been orthogonalized with respect to the former. As mentioned before,
the orthogonalized regressor equals to the difference between the risk-aversion weighted
holdings of the security and the unweighted holdings (total supply). If risk averse subjects
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Figure 8: Plot of relation of 36 estimated z-statistics corresponding to diagonal elements of
the coefficient matrix BW in (3.5) (regressors are orthogonalized with respect to regressors
in (3.4)) and 36 estimated z-statistics corresponding to diagonal (left panel) and off-
diagonal (right panel) elements of the coefficient matrix B in (3.4). All transaction price
changes over intervals of five (5) trades for a security in one session-treatment constitute
a sample from which a single z-statistic is estimated. The left panel’s slope of the linear
regression (yellow line) is significant at p = 0.05. It is insignificant (p > 0.10) on the right
panel.
hold more of the security than others, the orthogonalized regressor is positive. Since its
coefficient is negative, the induced price change is negative. It is intuitive what this is
telling: risk averse agents pull down prices if they are holding too much of a risky security.
Effectively, the ABL model under-estimates how much risk averse agents are willing to
pull down prices. While we have been assuming that impatience is the same across agents,
risk averse participants appear to be more impatient. This is consistent with subject-level
data reported in Asparouhova and Bossaerts (2009).
No such relationship can be discerned when plotting estimated z-statistics for the or-
thogonalized Walrasian excess demands against the estimated z-statistics corresponding
to the off-diagonal elements of B (point (ii) above). See Figure 8b.
By transforming the ABL regressors using Ω, we obtain an elegant way to compare
data across treatments. Lost in this transformation is the difference in dynamics between
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the treatments: cross-security impact of excess demands on price changes are significant
and of opposite sign. By merely changing the signs of the payoff covariances, we man-
aged to induce fundamentally different price dynamics. See Asparouhova, Bossaerts and
Plott (2003) for direct evidence, including experiments with three (rather than two) risky
securities.
4.2. Allocations
Diagonal Elements of B in 3.7. Figure 9a displays the z-statistics pertaining to the
diagonal elements of the coefficient matrix B in (3.7). These are z-statistics for the 36
security-session-treatment regressions of changes in per-capita holdings of the most risk
averse subject group onto the difference in risk-aversion scaled holdings of the two securi-
ties and the per-capita risk-aversion scaled holdings, pre-multiplied by the payoff covari-
ance matrix. The ABL model predicts negative coefficients. Figure 9a shows that, with a
few exceptions, the z-statistics are indeed negative. The vast majority have values beyond
the critical bound -2 (corresponding to p = 0.02). As before, the theoretical density of the
z-statistics under the null that the regressor does not correlate with allocation changes
is depicted with a solid black curve. The solid red line depicts the estimated density of
the z-statistics. Most of the mass is outside the interval of z-statistics where, under the
null of no effect, 96% of the outcomes live, namely [−2, 2]. The dotted red line indicates
the theoretical density of the z-statistics under the alternative that the effect is the same
as that for the average z-statistic. This density hardly overlaps with that under the null
hypothesis. The estimated density of the z-statistics is far more spread out, however, sug-
gesting that the diagonal coefficients differ across session-treatments and securities. We
presume that the heterogeneity emerges because of differing impatience and/or liquidity
parameters. Ignoring the outlier, the estimated density is bell-shaped, suggesting that the
standard errors are well-specified.
Overall, these statistical results provide strong support for our theory.
Off-Diagonal Elements of B in 3.7. Off-Diagonal elements of the regression coefficient
matrix B should be zero in (3.7). Figure 9b shows that the z-statistics straddle zero, and
that the theoretical density centered around the mean estimate (dotted red line) overlaps
largely with the theoretical density under the null hypothesis of no effect (solid black line).
34
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
Diagonal Estimated z-Statistics
(H1 Density Centered at Estimated Mean)
-40 -30 -20 -10 0 10 20
z
Value of Coefficient
Theoretical Density under H0
Theoretical Density under H1
Kernel-Estimated Density
(a) Diagonal Elements of B
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
Off-Diagonal Estimated z-Statistics
(H1 Density Centered at Estimated Mean)
-30 -20 -10 0 10 20 30
z
Value of Coefficient
Theoretical Density under H0
Theoretical Density under H1
Kernel-Estimated Density
(b) Off-Diagonal Elements of B
Figure 9: Plot of 36 estimated z-statistics (stems) corresponding to diagonal (left panel)
and off-diagononal (right panel) elements of the coefficient matrix B in (3.7). All allocation
changes over intervals of five (5) trades for a security in one session-treatment constitute a
sample from which a single z-statistic is estimated. Only allocation changes of the subject
group with the highest risk aversion coefficient are included. Regressand is the average
allocation change in that group. See caption of Figure 6a for further information.
However, the estimated density of the z-statistics (solid red line) is far more spread out
than that under the null. This suggests that the true coefficients could be random, with
a mean indistinguishable from zero. That is, our theory works on average, but there are
deviations that the theory cannot explain. Evidently, these deviations can go either way.
We have defined a “treatment” as a sequence of periods in a session where the payoff co-
variance matrix is kept positive. In Sessions 5–9, initial allocations, and hence, equilibrium
prices, changed across periods in a treatment. However, in Sessions 1–4, everything else
remained the same across the periods of a treatment. As a result, the within-treatment
periods were identical replications. Because of this, there is a possibility that participants
started building expectations of price changes. Our theory assumes that agents cannot rea-
sonably build expectations, and hence, behave in a myopic way (Hypothesis 4). We also
tested the ABL model on a subset of unique periods within each treatment. Qualitatively,
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the inference is the same.41
5. IMPLICATIONS FOR FINANCE
5.1. Asset Pricing
Financial economists are interested in models that relate asset prices to covariances of
their payoffs with some measure of aggregate risk. The CAPM provided the first example
of this type of model. There, the price of an asset decreases in the covariance between
its payoff and the payoff on the market portfolio. The market portfolio contains all risky
securities, with units assigned to each security equal to the per-capita endowments. Roll
has shown that CAPM obtains because, in equilibrium, the market portfolio is mean-
variance optimal (Roll, 1977).
Here, we identify a portfolio with which to price all risky securities even off-equilibrium.
We search for a benchmark portfolio that is mean-variance optimal throughout equili-
bration. Roll (1977) has shown that such a portfolio always exists (barring arbitrage
opportunities), and that it prices all assets as follows. For a mean-variance efficient port-
folio with composition (vector of units of each of the assets) v, there exists a scalar β > 0
so that:
(5.1) q = µ− βΩv.
Recall that, at any moment during the ABL equilibration process, prices follow a system
of difference equations that depend on the weighted averages of agents’ marginal rates of
substitution. See (2.10). This system of difference equations pushes prices towards levels
where they are equal to those averages: q → ρ¯. Translated to our economy with quasi-linear
preferences, and assuming that impatience parameters are equal across agents, this implies
that prices exponentially converge to q∗ = ρ¯(x) = µ − Ω1
I
∑
airi. The interpretation of
this system of equations becomes clearer if we re-write it as follows:
(5.2) q∗ = µ− βΩ
I∑
i=1
ai∑
j a
j
ri,where β =
∑
j a
j
I
.
41Results are available upon request, and will be posted online together with the dataset and the
statistical programs.
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With reference to (5.1), this means that prices tend to make a particular portfolio mean-
variance optimal. The portfolio is the one constructed from weighing holdings (ri) with
risk aversion (ai). We referred to this portfolio before as the Risk-Aversion Weighted
Endowment Portfolio (RASE). Mathematically, the weights equal ai∑
j a
j .
We thus have obtained the remarkable result that, throughout equilibration, prices tend
towards levels that make the RASE portfolio mean-variance optimal. Even if the market
portfolio is off the mean-variance frontier throughout, RASE will tend towards it. Of
course, as agents trade, their portfolios of risky assets will gradually converge (weights
will become the same), while they will generally end up with different holdings of the
numeraire. The RASE portfolio eventually converges to the market portfolio.
Because the result is only a tendency,42 we cannot claim that the RASE portfolio is
mean-variance optimal throughout equilibration. Instead, we make a weaker prediction,
which is that the Sharpe ratio of the RASE portfolio is continuously higher than that of the
market portfolio. The Sharpe ratio of a portfolio is the ratio of expected return in excess of
the risk free rate and the return volatility. The return is defined as the end-of period payoff
of the portfolio divided by the value of the portfolio at most recent transaction prices. The
Sharpe ratio is maximal for a mean-variance optimal portfolio. We test whether RASE
has a higher Sharpe ratio than the market portfolio.
There are 62 periods across all 9 sessions.43 We test whether the Sharpe ratio of RASE
is higher than that of the market in these 62 periods. At intervals of 5 trades, we compute
the RASE portfolio and evaluate its Sharpe ratio. We do the same for the market portfolio,
and compute the difference between the Sharpe ratio of RASE and the market portfolio.
We then calculate the average of this difference for the period, and the corresponding
z-statistic. We thus obtain 62 z-statistics. Figure 10a plots them as (blue) stems.
The vast majority of the z-statistics are positive, and 46 out of 62 reach a value above 2
(p << 0.001), confirming that the RASE portfolio tends to dominate the market portfolio
in mean-variance space. However, there are quite a few negative observations as well, some
of them way in the left tail of the theoretical density under the null that the two portfolios
42We qualified the result as a tendency. (5.2) is the steady-state point of a dynamic set of equations for
prices. If allocations change before reaching the steady state, the dynamic set changes. The nature of the
steady-state point does not change, however: it remains the risk-aversion weighted endowment portfolio.
Still, the weights change, however, as holdings shift through trade.
43Four (4) sessions with 8 periods and five (5) sessions with 6 periods.
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Figure 10: Panel (a) plots of 62 estimated z-statistics (stems) testing whether the average
Sharpe ratio of the RASE portfolio is higher than that of the market portfolio. Sharpe
ratios are re-computed every 5 trades. Each period in the experiment generates one sample
for which a z-statistic is estimated. Solid red curve depicts kernel-estimated density of the
z-statistics. Dotted red curve depicts Gaussian curve centered at the mean z-statistic and
assuming unit variance. Solid black curve depicts N(0, 1), the theoretical density under
the null that the Sharpe ratio differences are zero. Panel (b) plots the 62 average Sharpe
ratios of the RASE portfolio against those of the market portfolio. Red line denotes 45
degree line. Orange line depicts best linear fit (slope is significantly larger than 45 degrees
at p = 0.09)
generate the same Sharpe ratio (black solid line). A comparison of the theoretical density
under the alternative that the expected z-statistic equals the sample average44 (dotted
red line), and the estimated density of the z-statistics (solid red line) reveals substantial
heterogeneity across periods. The former hardly overlaps with the theoretical density
under the null, but the latter has a significant overlap in the left tail.
Sharpe ratios were re-evaluated every five (5) trades. It may be that intervals of five
trades are insufficiently long for the hypothesized effect to emerge. But the tendency is
apparent: there is a portfolio that most likely will generate a higher Sharpe ratio than the
market portfolio.
44Sample average of z-statistics = 9.114.
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In historical data from field stock markets, the Sharpe ratios of proxies of the market
portfolio have been found to be lower than those of portfolios that put more weight on, say,
high-value stock and smaller firms. See Fama and French (2004). It would be interesting
to determine to which extent the weight adjustments needed to beat market proxies in the
field reflect differences in holdings of component securities across investors with varying
levels of risk aversion. These adjustments make up the differences between RASE and the
market portfolio. Of course, the lower performance of the market proxies in historical data
from the field may also reflect that these are only proxies, and not the true market. In
our experiments, we know what the true market portfolio is. Regardless, the finding that
RASE tends to dominate in terms of Sharpe ratio even off-equilibrium provides a sensible
alternative explanation for the poor historical performance of the market portfolio. We
leave these and related issues for future work.
Further analysis of our data reveals that the RASE portfolio tends to perform better
(in terms of Sharpe ratio) when the market Sharpe ratio is higher. Figure 10b plots the
62 average Sharpe ratios of RASE against those of the market portfolio. The solid red
line depicts the 45 degree line. If an observation lies above this line, it implies that RASE
performs better than the market portfolio. The dotted red line depicts a linear (OLS) fit
(slope: 1.0416, p = 0.09 for null hypothesis that slope equals 45 degrees). The difference
between the linear fit and the 45 degree line increases as the Sharpe ratio of the market
increases: RASE tends to outperform more when the market portfolio generates a higher
Sharpe ratio.
5.2. Momentum, Volume and Liquidity
Momentum.
In the ABL model, prices change in reaction to average marginal rates of substitu-
tion, see (2.10). Agents’ marginal rates of substitution change in response to changes
in holdings due to trade. As a result, a rich pattern of price dynamics is possible. In
particular, it generates interesting cross-autocorrelations that, like the cross-security ef-
fects of risk-aversion weighted excess demands on price changes, depend on payoff co-
variances. Cross-autocorrelation intensities depend crucially on adjustment parameters,
such as the liquidity parameters αk and the impatience parameters ci. This means that
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cross-autocorrelation patterns could provide statistical input to infer those adjustment
parameters.
Interestingly, cross-autocorrelations have been recorded in historical field data. Impor-
tantly, they are thought to be the key factor behind the momentum effect, i.e., the find-
ing that recent winners outperform recent losers, even after adjusting for risk (Lewellen,
2002). Momentum has always been considered to be puzzling. Here, momentum emerges
as a feature of off-equilibrium dynamics, through cross-autocorrelations tied to adjust-
ment dynamics. Indeed, prices of some securities adjust faster than others, because trade
in those securities leads to larger utility increases, or because agents with higher risk
aversion or trading impatience are disproportionately invested in them.
When analyzing the experimental data, however, we uncovered little evidence of mo-
mentum. Presumably, this is because, with only 2 risky securities, the power to discover
momentum is reduced. We leave exploration of momentum in experiments with larger
cross-sections for future work.
Remark 6 Absent knowledge of economy-wide parameters, agents cannot exploit the
features of price dynamics reported in the Results section. For instance, agents lack the
information needed to form estimates of risk-aversion weighted excess demands, which are
needed to predict price changes. Momentum, however, is a portfolio that can be constructed
in the absence of structural knowledge of the economy. Since momentum should be prof-
itable in our setting, some agents may want to exploit it. An interesting issue for future
research is to determine to what extent this would cause equilibrium convergence to fail.
Volume and Liquidity.
Our allocation dynamics have immediate consequences for volume, and hence, liquidity.
To see how, remember individual allocation dynamics (3.6):
rit+1 − rit = − c¯Ω
(
airit −
∑
i a
irit
I
)
.
Now consider the following cases.
• Case 1. Everyone starts from the same initial allocations, meaning that all agents
hold the market portfolio: ri0 = r¯. Risk aversion coefficients (ai) are different, how-
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ever. In this case, the initial adjustment is as follows:
ri1 − ri0 = − c¯
(
ai −
∑
i a
i
I
)
Ωr¯.
The changes in holdings are a linear transformation of the market portfolio. Except
in the unlikely event that the market portfolio is an eigenvector of Ω, agents must
initially trade away from the market portfolio. That is, they start from CAPM equi-
librium holdings, only to immediately deviate. The more extreme one’s risk aversion
(ai) is relative to the average, the farther away the initial movement is. Ignoring
off-diagonal terms of Ω, the more risk averse agents sell securities, focusing on the
most risky ones (highest variance). Likewise, less risk averse agents do what is locally
optimal: increase risk exposure by prioritizing purchases of the most risky securities.
The effect of the off-diagonal elements of Ω, the payoff covariances, merits separate
discussion. When the covariances are negative, agents’ portfolios remain closer to the
market portfolio than in the scenario when payoff covariances are zero or positive.
The intuition is simple: when payoff covariances are negative, assets are natural
hedges for one another. Increasing one’s risk exposure by buying the most risky
securities leads to a less diversified portfolio, i.e., to utility losses. Maximum local
gains in utility are obtained by trading combinations of securities that are closer
to the per-capita average endowment, i.e., the market portfolio. As a consequence,
throughout equilibration, agents stay closer to the market portfolio than in the
scenario where payoff covariances are zero or positive.
• Case 2. Agents start with different endowments but have the same risk aversion
ai = a¯. Then:
ri1 − ri0 = − c¯a¯ Ω
(
ri0 − r¯
)
.
Here, agents adjust smoothly towards the market portfolio. Since the covariance
matrix Ω multiplies the deviations of initial holdings from the market portfolio,
adjustment will again be faster in the high-variance securities. As in Case 1, this
effect will be attenuated if the off-diagonal elements of Ω (covariances) are negative.
The two cases reveal that adjustment will be faster in the high-variance assets. This
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means that liquidity will initially be highest in the high-variance assets. Negative off-
diagonal terms (negative covariances) may partially offset this tendency.
But this only concerns liquidity when allocations are far from equilibrium. Closer to
equilibrium, all efforts are concentrated on trading towards the market portfolio. In Case
1 above, individual holdings moved away from the market portfolio. Because the low-
variance asset holdings have not been adjusted commensurate with the high-variance asset
holdings, final adjustments are needed in the former, and hence, liquidity moves towards
the low-variance assets when the economy is closer to reaching equilibrium allocations.
This is a novel prediction of our theory, worthy of further exploration, both in follow-up
experiments with more than 2 risky assets, and in historical data from field markets.
A recent explanation of volume and liquidity has focused on optimal attention, see
Karlsson, Loewenstein, and Seppi (2009). There is a relationship between this explanation
and ours. Agents’ trade intensities are determined by the gradient of their utilities: agents
trade faster in assets that provide a higher increase in utility. In optimal attention models,
trade is also determined by assets that generate the highest potential change in utility.
Another recent theory of volume and liquidity has focused on portfolio separation; see
Lo and Wang (2000). The reasoning is as follows. Since optimal portfolios can be described
in terms of a limited number of benchmark portfolios, agents merely need to trade those
portfolios. Absent direct access to the benchmark portfolios, trade in individual assets
should only take place in proportion to the weights of the assets in the benchmark portfo-
lios. Consequently, turnover (volume divided by total supply) is predicted to be constant
across assets. As an example, take Case 1 above: all agents have the same endowment
(hence, all endowments are a fixed combination of the riskfree asset and the market port-
folio), but exhibit differing risk preferences. In the world of Lo and Wang (2000), more risk
averse agents reduce their exposure to risk by trading the market portfolio with less risk
averse agents, or, absent direct trade in the market portfolio, they trade the component
assets in proportion to their weights in the market portfolio. As a result, volume will be
proportional to weights in the market portfolio, and turnover will be constant.
Our predictions are markedly different : agents initially trade the asset with the highest
variance (ignoring payoff covariances, which may attenuate the variance effect). Volume
will therefore be proportional to (payoff) variance. As the economy approaches its equi-
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librium allocations, however, more trade will take place in the low-variance assets. Con-
sequently, the relation between volume and variance is obscured by how far the economy
is off equilibrium. One could turn this around: the relation between volume and variance
is an indication of how far the economy is from equilibrium.
Interestingly, Lo and Wang (2000) show that, historically, volume on the NYSE and
AMEX tends to increase when idiosyncratic risk is higher. Since idiosyncratic risk is a
large proportion of total risk, this suggests that volume increases in (total) variance,
consistent with an economy that is far from equilibrium.
6. CONCLUDING COMMENTS
Previous research has shown that standard global tatonnement and non-tatonnement are
not consistent with within-period price dynamics in continuous double auctions (CDAs).
Building on earlier experimental evidence from single CDAs (Friedman, 1991; Plott, 2000),
we describe a Marshallian theory of the forces driving the economy to equilibrium. The
theory is applicable to multiple, simultaneous CDAs and consistent with experimental
findings with continuous double auction markets. Our theory was built from the level of
the agents up, to obtain implications for market-wide price and allocation dynamics. Our
theory is based on three main assumptions. One, agents in CDAs only submit (small)
orders that maximize local gains from trade. Two, quantity moves to agents who offer the
higher surplus to the market. Three, agents’ bids are benchmarked against lagged prices.
In our experiments, we induced quasi-linear, mean-variance preferences in a way that
makes the economy isomorphic to a CAPM one. The findings are in line with the theoret-
ical predictions. Price changes correlated not only with own risk-aversion weighted excess
demand, but also with risk-aversion weighted excess demands in other assets, in ways
that related to the payoff covariance matrix. Traditional Walrasian excess demands either
did not provide additional explanatory power or predicted price changes in a direction
that is opposite to that expected. Our model correctly captured dynamics of the average
allocation of participants stratified by risk aversion. Cross-equation effects emerged here
as well, again determined by the covariance matrix (Hessian of the utility function).
Beyond price and allocation dynamics, we discovered that prices tend in a direction
that makes one portfolio mean-variance optimal throughout equilibration. This portfolio,
the risk-aversion scaled endowment portfolio (RASE), re-assigns weights in the market
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portfolio depending on the risk aversion of the agents holding the component assets.
Our results are not isolated to the experiments reported here. In Appendix F.2, we
corroborate the findings in about 3200 observations from three sessions of four-asset
experiments. The sessions differ from the ones reported on in the paper, in that: (i)
mean-variance preferences are not induced; instead states are actually realized, though
mean-variance preferences appear to capture price behavior well; (ii) there is no deliber-
ate attempt to control the relation between excess demands and transaction price changes
through changes in payoff covariances. In addition, Asparouhova, Bossaerts and Plott
(2003) reports an analogous link between payoff covariances, on the one hand, and the
relation between excess demands and price changes, on the other hand, in over 11,000
transaction price changes from eight sessions with three assets. Finally, Gillen e.a. (2020)
also reports cross-security effects in price changes and excess demands in an unrelated,
three-commodity experiment. Our theory generically predicts such cross-effects.
Much remains to be done. We have not allowed for speculation, and information (about
final payoffs) was homogeneous. As to historical analysis of field markets, however, our
findings should invite empiricists to re-assess prices, momentum, volume and liquidity,
using our theory as guidance. One interesting question, for instance, is whether there is a
relationship between our RASE portfolio and the factor portfolios that have historically
out-performed buying and holding the market portfolio (in terms of Sharpe ratios).
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APPENDIX A: PROOFS
A.1. Incentive Compatibility of Optimal Bidding Strategy
About Remark 1: We prove here that, if both the quantity adjustment and the price
setting rules are known, if αk = α, ∀k, and if bids are a local Nash equilibrium, then
Hypothesis 4 is satisfied.
Proof: Suppose all i believe Hypothesis 1; that is, ∆rit = A(bit − qt). Further suppose
they believe, as implied by Hypotheses 1 and 3, that qt = (1/I)
∑
bit. Further suppose
they choose bit to be a local Nash Equilibrium. That is, for every i,
bit ∈ argmax ∆uit = (ρit − qt)A(bit − qt)(A.1)
= (ρit −
∑
j b
j
t
I
)A(bit −
∑
j b
j
t
I
)(A.2)
Letting b¯t =
∑
bjt
I
, the first order conditions for this are: −1
I
(bik,t − b¯k,t)αk + I−1I (ρik,t −
b¯k,t)αk = 0 or bit = b¯t + (I − 1)(ρit − b¯t). Summing over i gives b¯t = ρˆt =
∑
ρit
I
. So the
local Nash equilibrium has bit = ρˆt + (I − 1)(ρit − ρˆt). Since qt = b¯t = ρˆt this means
bit = qt + (I − 1)(ρit − qt). Let ci = α I−1∆ .
A.2. Derivation of ABL Dynamics
From Hypotheses 1-4 , we have
rit+∆ − rit = ∆A(bit − qt)(A.3)
sit+∆ − sit = −qt · (rit+∆ − rit)(A.4) ∑
i
(rit+∆ − rit) = 0(A.5)
bit − qt−∆ = ciA−1(ρit − qt−∆)(A.6)
Substitute bt from (A.6) into (A.3) to get
rit+∆ − rit = ∆A(qt−∆ − qt) + ∆ci(ρit − qt−∆)(A.7)
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Sum (A.7) over all i to get
qt − qt−∆ = ∆A−1c¯(ρ¯t − qt−∆)(A.8)
Substitute (A.8) into (A.7) to get
rit+∆ − rit = ∆
(−c¯(ρ¯t − qt−∆) + ci(ρit − qt−∆))(A.9)
A.3. Proof of (2.11)-(2.13)
The dynamics of our model are
qk,t = qk,t−∆ + ∆
c¯
αk
(ρ¯k,t − qk,t−∆)
q0 = ρ¯0
rik,t+∆ = r
i
k,t + αk∆(qk,t−∆ − qk,t) + ci∆(ρik,t − qk,t−∆)
sit+∆ = s
i
t − qt · (rit − rit−∆).
(The third equation uses (A.7)).These contain a subtlety that must be dealt with if we
want to let ∆ → 0 to get the continuous version. This is a set of second-order difference
equations since they specify dynamics over two intervals: [t−∆, t) and [t, t+ ∆). To get
them into a standard set of first-order difference equations, let zt = qt−∆ and then, with
a little algebra, rewrite the equations as:
zt+∆ − zt = ∆A−1c¯(ρ¯− zt)
rit+∆ − rit = ∆
(
ci(ρit − zt)− c¯(ρ¯t − zt)
)
sit+∆ − sit = ∆ (−zt+∆) ·
(
ci(ρit − zt)− c¯(ρ¯t − zt)
)
As ∆→ 0, everything is well-behaved, and we end up with
dz
dt
= A−1c¯(ρ¯t − zt)
dri
dt
=
(
ci(ρit − zt)− c¯(ρ¯t − zt)
)
dsi
dt
= −zt ·
(
ci(ρit − zt)− c¯(ρ¯t − zt)
)
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Now, note that as ∆→ 0, zt = qt−∆t → qt. Substituting this, gives (2.11) - (2.13).
A.4. Proof of Theorem 1
Theorem 1: (Convergence to Pareto Optimality)
Let xt = (st, rt). If (i) there are no income effects, i.e., ui0(xi) = 1 (wlog) for all i
and all xi ∈ X, and (ii) xit > 0 for all t, then for the dynamics in (2.8) and (2.10),
(xt, pt)→ (x∗, p∗) where x∗ is Pareto-optimal and e(p∗, x∗) = 0.
Proof: We use
∑
ciui as a Lyapunov function. Let κi = ci(ρi − q). Then we can write
d(
∑
i c
iui)/dt =
∑
i c
i dui
dt
=
∑
ci(ρi− q)drit
dt
=
∑
i c
i(ρiq)[c
i(ρi− q)− c¯(ρ¯− q)] = [(∑κiκi)−
(1/I)
∑
k(
∑
κik)(
∑
κik). By the triangle inequality,
∑ ||κi||2 ≥ ||∑κi||2. Therefore∑ ||κi||2 >
(1/I)||∑κik||2 if κi 6= 0 for some i. Therefore, d(∑ ciui)/dt > 0 unless κi = 0 for all i
which is true iff ρi = q for all i. That is, convergence ends at a Pareto-optimal allocation.
Remark 7 Condition (i) is included because we do not have a proof of convergence
for utilities with income effects. We also do not have a counter example where such con-
vergence will not occur. One could, of course, revise the model and impose a no-regret
condition on trades that would ensure duit/dt ≥ 0. This would guarantee convergence. We
do not do that here because, as we will see below, the model as it now stands is consistent
with the data. If it is the right model of behavior in the CDA experiments, then a lack of
convergence would be a feature and not a bug.
Remark 8 Condition (ii) is included above for technical reasons. If duit/dt ≥ 0 along
the path for all i, then (ii) would not be necessary. But when duit/dt < 0 is possible for
some i, we need to worry about xi hitting the boundary of the feasible consumption set.
There are standard ways to modify (2.11)-(2.13) to deal with this. We do not pursue them
here.
APPENDIX B: LOCAL MARSHALLIAN EQUILIBRIUM (LME)
B.1. Theory
In the ABL model of individual behavior, Hypothesis 4, we assumed that bids at t
are based on the prices and allocations arrived at in the interval t − ∆. But another
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hypothesis might be that bids and prices are simultaneously determined within the time
∆. It is interesting to consider what the dynamics of price formation would then look like.
We begin with
Hypothesis 6 Local Optimization
bit = qt + c
i∆A−1(ρi(xit)− qt),∀i,∀t > 0.
It is easy to compute the local equilibrium in the interval [t, t+ ∆).
Lemma 1 Local Marshallian Equilibrium (LME). Under Hypotheses 1-3, and 6,
qt =
∑
i b
i
t
I
= b¯t =
∑
i c
iρi(xit)∑
i c
i
= ρ¯(xt).
Proof: Hypotheses 1-3 imply qt =
∑
i b
i
t
I
. Then summing bit from Hypothesis 6 gives the
desired result.
Q.E.D.
qt is the local Marshallian equilibrium price, at which individuals will not want to change
their bids and at which Marshallian trading is feasible.
The dynamics of the LME model are:45
rit+∆ = r
i
t + c
i∆(ρi(xit)− qt),∀i,(B.1)
sit+∆ = s
i
t − qt · (rit+∆ − rit), ∀i,(B.2)
qt = ρ¯(xt).(B.3)
45There is a close correspondence between these dynamics and those found in Champsaur and Cornet
(1990). Their agents also choose locally to maximize gains. However, at each point in time a local Walrasian
equilibrium is attained.
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Dividing (B.1) and (B.2) by ∆ and letting ∆→ 0 leads to a continuous-time theory:46
drit
dt
= ci(ρi(xit)− qt), ∀i,(B.4)
dsit
dt
= −qt · dr
i
t
dt
, ∀i,(B.5)
qt = ρ¯(xt).(B.6)
In continuous time, the process (B.4)-(B.6) will converge to a rest point from any initial
price and allocation, even if there are income effects. This may not be true for (B.1)-(B.3)
in discrete time if step sizes are too large.
Theorem 2 (Convergence to Pareto Optimality)
For the dynamics in (B.4)-(B.6), (xt, pt) → (x∗, p∗) where x∗ is Pareto-optimal and
(p∗, x∗) is a competitive equilibrium at x∗.
Proof: For each i, du
i
t
dt
= ui0,t(ρ
i
t − qt) · dr
i
t
dt
= ui0,t(ρ
i
t − qt) · ci(ρit − qt) > 0 unless ρit = qt.
Therefore d(
∑
uit)/dt > 0 unless ρit = qt for all i. This, and the continuity of the differential
equation system allows us to use
∑
ui as a Lyapunov function and apply the standard
asymptotic convergence theorems. Q.E.D.
B.2. LME vs ABL
To see how the ABL model differs from the LME model, consider the following. Hypothe-
ses 1-3 imply that qt =
∑
i b
i
t
I
in both the ABL and LME models. In both models, prices
always equal the average of the bids in the market. But the two models differ in how aver-
age bids relate to the underlying utility functions. Under Hypothesis 6 of the LME model,∑
i b
i
t
I
= ρ¯(xt). Under Hypothesis 4 of the ABL model,
∑
i b
i
t
I
= qt−∆ + c¯∆A−1(ρ¯(xt)− qt−∆).
That is, in LME prices immediately change to the weighted average of the willingness to
pay (at new holdings). In ABL prices adjust exponentially toward the weighted average
of the willingness to pay. As such, in the ABL model, prices react more slowly to changes
in allocations.
46This is essentially the model in Ledyard (1974). In that paper, however, the model was ad hoc. Here
we have provided a micro-foundation for it.
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The difference between LME and ABL is even starker in the CAPM environment. For
the ABL model, the price dynamic in the CAPM environment is, from (2.16):
qt − qt−∆
∆
= A−1Ω
∑
ciaiei(qt−∆, xit)
I
(B.7)
For the LME model in the CAPM environment,47
qt − qt−∆
∆
= − 1∑
ci
Ω2
∑
ci(ai)2ei(qt−∆, xit−∆).(B.8)
Two striking differences with respect to dynamics emerge under ABL. First, analogous
to Walrasian dynamics, price changes depend on excess demands evaluated at past al-
locations. Second, a minus sign features in front of the equations. This implies, among
others, that a commodity’s price change is opposite to its own (weighted) excess demand.
If (weighted) excess demand is positive, the price drops. Neither prediction is upheld in
the data.48
APPENDIX C: SPECULATION
To see what happens if agents were to speculate, consider the continuous-time problem
of optimally adjusting the flow of trade zit = drit subject to a bound on the flow size
|zit|2 ≤ γ and assuming that the agent believes prices follow an Itô process. Let J denote
the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman value function (expected utility of final consumption of the
commodities, as a function of the current state, consisting of current prices and current
holdings). Let Jr denote the vector of partial derivatives of J with respect to the holdings
47To obtain the result, (i) take first differences of (B.3) after lagging (qt−qt−∆), then (ii) replace ρi(xi)
with µ − aiΩri in order to re-express the equations in terms of rit − rit−∆ and (iii) finally use (B.1) and
the formula for CAPM excess demands, namely, ei(qt−∆, xit−∆) =
1
ai Ω
−1(µ− qt−∆)− rit−∆.
48It may not be immediately obvious how the results are inconsistent with the second prediction, since
we transformed the regressors using Ω. The price dynamics in (B.8) imply that the regression coefficient
matrix is proportional to −Ω, which has negative diagonal elements. The data reject this. Note that
the off-diagonal elements of the coefficient matrix are nonzero. But their sign changes depending on the
treatment; on average (across treatments), they equal zero. In the regressions, we did not distinguish
between treatments. This was not necessary under ABL after transformation of the regressors using Ω.
ABL and LME therefore make similar but not identical predictions about the off-diagonal elements of
the coefficient matrix: under ABL, the true coefficients are identically zero; under LME, they are zero
on average, across treatments. If the latter had been true, then the distribution of the corresponding
z-statistics would have been affected by mixing of means, and hence, flatter than observed (compare
Figures 6b and 5 [Left Panel]).
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rik,t, and J0 the partial derivative of J with respect to sit. It can be shown that the optimal
trade flows satisfy the following equations:
zik,t ∼ ui0,t(ρik(xit)− qk,t) + (Jr,k − J0qk,t) .
The first term represents local optimization: desired trade flow is proportional to the gra-
dient of the utility function, subject to the budget constraint. The second term represents
speculation. Since J denotes the expected utility of the stock (holdings) of commodities
at the end of trading, Jr,k denotes the expected marginal utility of consumption of com-
modity k. If, at current prices, expected marginal utility of (eventual) consumption is
proportional to the price, the second term is zero, and optimal trade flow is solely de-
termined by local utility maximization. If marginal utility of a commodity is expected
to eventually be higher than the current price (modulo J0), the second term is positive,
and the agent trades more than is needed for local maximization. Eventually, marginal
utilities of consumption need to be aligned with prices: at the end of trading, i.e., at some
distant T , Jr,k = J0qk,T . If at current prices, Jr,k > J0qk,t, the agent must expect future
prices (qk,T ) to be higher than today’s (qk,t; again, we are ignoring changes in J0). Our
agent therefore speculates: she trades to a higher quantity (stock) of the commodity than
she expects to eventually want; she will later reduce holdings and profit from the expected
price increase.49
APPENDIX D: ABL IN CAPM
The price dynamics implied by our model in discrete time, see (2.10), are:
qt − qt−∆ = c¯∆A−1
(
µ− Ω
∑
i a
icirit∑
i c
i
− qt−∆
)
(D.1)
Since we want to compare this to the Walrasian model (2.3), we write it in terms
of excess demand functions. To find the Walrasian excess demand functions, maximize
µ · ri − ai
2
ri · (Ωri) − q · ri. At lagged prices, the individual Walrasian excess demand
49See Sundaresan (1989) or Constantinides (1990) for analogous applications of Itô calculus to deriving
optimal trade flow when utility depends on the cumulative stock (holdings).
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functions are
ei(qt−∆, xit) =
1
ai
Ω−1(µ− qt−∆)− rit.(D.2)
From (D.2), ciaiΩrit = ci(µ− qt−∆)− ciaiΩei(qt−∆, xit). Substituting this into (D.1), and
dividing by ∆, yields:50
qt − qt−∆
∆
= A−1Ω
∑
ciaiei(qt−∆, xit)
I
(D.3)
APPENDIX E: NEWTON-RAPHSON ALGORITHM VS ABL
It has often been said that the CDA is a computational device for finding the competitive
equilibrium prices and allocations (Bossaerts and Plott, 2008). This is because prices
in CDA experiments, without income effects and with one commodity plus numeraire,
sometimes seem to mimic the Newton-Raphson (NR) algorithm which computes the zeros
of a set of equations. To compute the p∗ = (1, q∗) that satisfies E(q∗, ω) = 0 (i.e., to
compute equilibrium prices), the NR algorithm does the following sequential computation:
qt − qt−∆ =
[
∂E(qt−∆, ω)
∂q
]−1
E(qt−∆, ω)(E.1)
For the CAPM model, ∂E(qt−∆,ω)
∂q
=
∑
i
1
ai
Ω−1. Therefore, qt − qt−∆ = aˆΩ
∑
i e
i(qt−∆, ω),
where aˆ =
[∑
i
(
1
ai
)]−1. The similarity of this to (2.16) is interesting. The Hessian of
the utility functions plays a key role in both. However, the two are different. In ABL the
weighted excess demand curves are important while in NR they are not. ABL follows a
different path from NR.
APPENDIX F: EXPERIMENTS: SETUP AND ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE
F.1. The Structure of Market Experiments
For those unfamiliar with market experiments, a brief introduction follows. Participants
are solicited, usually via email invitations, to come and participate in an experimental
50(2.16) does not imply causation. That is, prices are not “responding to excess demands”. It is simply
a feature of the quadratic preferences of the CAPM model that let us write price changes for the ABL
model this way. The theory merely says that the path of prices will satisfy (2.16).
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session at a given location (or, in some instances, access the experiment online) and
at a given time. Each experimental session starts with an instructional period, where
the rules of engagement are explained, participants are given the opportunity to ask
questions, familiarize themselves with the trading software and participate in a practice
trading session. An experiment proceeds in a series of replications, called periods. At the
beginning of a period each participant i is given an initial endowment of commodities (or
financial assets), wi. Markets open and participants are free to trade subject to the usual
budget constraints. Trading occurs via a market institution of the experimenter’s choice.
At the end of a period, participant i will have traded di and will have final holdings of
xi = wi+di. Participants receive payments according to a payoff function ui(xi), specified
by the experimenter and presented to the participants during the instructional period. In
some sessions all periods are payoff-relevant. In others, participants go through several
periods and only some are chosen at random to be payoff-relevant.
Two standard trading institutions used in experiments are the Continuous Double Auc-
tion (CDA) and the Call Market (CM). The CDA is a trading process in which participants
post limit buy and sell offers by specifying quantity and price (for example, a limit buy
offer is an offer the buy a specified quantity at or below the offer price; offers are usually
valid until canceled or executed, i.e., there is usually no option to have the offers lapse). In
most cases the offers are displayed in an open book, i.e, they are visible to all participants.
When someone submits a buy offer (bid) with a limit price above that of the best sell offer
(ask) in the book, a trade takes place, at the standing offer limit price. Conversely, when
someone submits a sell offer (ask) with a limit price below that of the best buy offer (bid)
in the book, a trade takes place, at the bid limit price. When accepted an offer becomes
part of a transaction and it is withdrawn from the order book. The CDA can be thought
as an example of a system that facilitates non-tatonnement dynamics.
In a call market, participants also post buy and sell offers by specifying quantity and
price but, contrary to the CDA, no transaction occurs or is accepted until the market
is “called." If the book is closed (i,e, subjects cannot see each others’ bids), this is just
a sealed bid auction. If the book is open (i.e., participants can see each others’ bids)
and subjects can withdraw their bids and submit new ones, the call market becomes an
example of a system that facilitates tatonnement dynamics.
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In the paper we report on periods in the experiment when trade took place using the
CDA. In Sessions 5–9, trade in some periods took place using a call mechanism. We do
not include those periods in the analysis.
F.2. Additional Experimental Evidence
We here provide further demonstration that the cross-asset effects of excess demand on
price changes replicates in four-asset experiments and even if CAPM preferences are not
induced, but risk is actually realized. This means that participants come with home-grown
preferences. From a pricing point of view, this does not matter: standard asset pricing
results such as CAPM emerge even if uncertainty is explicit rather than induced through
a nonlinear payoff function (for background literature, see Biais, e.a. (2017); Bossaerts and
Plott (2004); Bossaerts, Plott and Zame (2007); Crockett, Friedman and Oprea (2017)).
The experiment was designed as follows. Three sessions were run at Caltech using the
Marketscape interface (same interface as for Sessions 1–4 in the paper). There were four
assets. Three of them, called A, B and C, had a random payoff depending on the drawing
of one of four states. The fourth asset, the Note, was risk-free. In addition, cash was
available, which was to be used in buying and selling shares in the assets. The relation
between states and asset payoffs was as follows. States were equally likely to be drawn at
the end of a period.51
State X Y Z W
A 30 190 500 200
B 100 270 300 130
C 200 210 90 180
Note 100 100 100 100
The realization of the state was unknown to participants for the duration of the period
but the payoff distribution from which it was drawn (i.e., the table above) was public
information. The number of participants per experiment ranged from 29 to 70.
One can readily deduce expected payoffs. They were 230, 200 and 170, for A, B and C
respectively. The payoff covariance matrix can also be derived. Notice that, unlike in the
example market experiment discussed in Section 3, payoff variances are unequal.
51Notional currency, called “francs,” was used in all experiments. At the end of each experiment each
participant’s cumulative earnings from all periods were converted to US dollars at a pre-specified exchange
rate ($0.04 per franc).
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Ω A B C
A 28850 11575 -7375
B 11575 7450 -2225
C -7375 -2225 2250
Each session was organized as six to eight replications of the same situation. The Notes
could be held in positive or negative amounts, i.e. short selling of Notes was allowed.52
In contrast, the risky securities A, B, and C could only be held in non-negative amounts,
i.e. they could not be sold short. In the beginning of each period the assets were allocated
across subjects as shown in Table II. Cash was allocated against a loan. This leverages
their position and increases the risk of the endowments to the participants. As a result,
trade takes place because of risk aversion.
TABLE II
Experimental design data
Experiment Participant Signup Endowments Cash Loan Exchange
Category Reward A B C Notes Repayment Rate
Number (franc) (franc) (franc) $/franc
991026 13 0 4 0 5 0 400 2075 0.04
16 0 0 6 5 0 400 2350 0.04
001030 46 0 4 0 5 0 400 2075 0.04
22 0 0 6 5 0 400 2350 0.04
001106 47 0 4 0 5 0 400 2075 0.04
23 0 0 6 5 0 400 2350 0.04
No participant was given information regarding the asset allocations of the other par-
ticipants. In each period the markets were open for a pre-set amount of time, usually
ranging from 15 to 25 minutes. During open markets, the subjects had the opportunity
to trade securities for cash, and thus re-balance their initial portfolios, through an online,
continuous, anonymous open-book system (Marketscape). At the end of each period each
subject had his/her final portfolio of risky assets, Notes, and cash. Notice that Notes and
cash were perfect substitutes in the end of a period. However, because assets could only
be traded for cash, cash also had transaction value during the trading. When a period
closed the state was announced and earnings recorded, to be paid out at the end of the
experiment in real cash. New allocations of the assets were distributed and a fresh pe-
52When selling short a Note, the seller promises to pay the face value of the Note to the buyer when
the Note expires. Effectively, the seller borrows the purchase price; the face value of the Note acts as a
loan amount, inclusive of interest.
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riod opened (earnings from previous periods were NOT available as cash in subsequent
periods). Subjects whose earnings were sufficiently low were declared bankrupt and were
prevented from participating in subsequent periods.53 Earnings ranged from nothing (the
bankrupt participants) to over two hundred dollars.
Table III shows the results from OLS projections of price changes on excess demands
after each trade. Many cross-asset slope coefficients are significant. When significant, the
slope coefficients have the same sign as the corresponding element in the covariance ma-
trix. E.g., the excess demand of B for instance, correlates positively with subsequent
transaction price changes in A, which reflects the negative covariance between the payoffs
of A and B. With one exception, the insignificant coefficients also have the right sign.
This corroborates the findings in the paper for an experiment where quasi-linear prefer-
ences were not induced, but effectively obtained through uncertainty and risk aversion,
and where there were four assets, not three.
TABLE III
Evidence of cross-security effects in three sessions of a four-asset CAPM experiment
where uncertainty was explicit rather than induced through CAPM quasi-linear
payoff functions.
Exp. Asset Coefficients54 R2 F -stat.55
Constant Excess Demand56
A B C
991026 A 3.767∗ 1.918∗ 0.838∗ -0.473∗ 0.024 5.89
(N = 710) (1.814) (0.898) (0.408) (0.220)
B 1.784∗ 0.639 0.425∗ -0.123 0.031 7.64
(0.997) (0.480) (0.231) (0.115)
C -2.039∗∗ -0.914∗ -0.467∗∗ 0.214∗ 0.019 4.51
(0.878) (0.406) (0.204) (0.096)
001030 A 2.556∗∗ 2.933∗∗ 1.085∗∗ -0.775∗∗ 0.062 21.63
(N = 982) (0.789) (0.921) (0.358) (0.240)
B 0.466∗ 0.026 0.115 0.020 0.020 6.70
(0.249) (0.239) (0.091) (0.065)
C -0.336 -0.223 -0.032 0.076 0.008 2.75
(0.763) (0.746) (0.300) (0.192)
001106 A 0.687∗ 0.492∗∗ 0.205∗∗ -0.122∗∗ 0.012 6.22
(N = 1556) (0.416) (0.198) (0.091) (0.049)
B 0.692∗ 0.174 0.168∗ -0.018 0.019 10.11
(0.370) (0.143) (0.083) (0.032)
C -1.031∗∗ -0.376∗∗ -0.152∗∗ 0.100∗∗ 0.009 4.84
(0.282) (0.110) (0.051) (0.028)
APPENDIX G: EXPERIMENTAL PARAMETERS FOR SESSIONS 5-9
53For a participant to be declared bankrupt he/she had to have negative cumulative earnings for two
consecutive periods. See also Bossaerts and Plott (2004).
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Session Securities Risk Av.
100726 A B (ai)
Subjects (#):
Type 1 (9) Varying Across 0.06
Type 2 (9) Periods 0.1
Securities:
Exp Payoff ($) 0.75 0.75
Pay Variance 1.0 0.5
Period 1:
Pay Covariance -0.25
Market (Units) 4 3
CAPM Price 0.51 0.71
Period 2:
Pay Covariance -0.25
Market (Units) 4 3
CAPM Price 0.51 0.71
Period 3:
Pay Covariance -0.25
Market (Units) 4 3
CAPM Price 0.51 0.71
Period 4:
Pay Covariance 0.2
Market (Units) 4 3
CAPM Price 0.41 0.58
Period 5:
Pay Covariance 0.2
Market (Units) 4 3
CAPM Price 0.41 0.58
Period 6
Pay Covariance 0.2
Market (Units) 4 3
CAPM Price 0.41 0.58
Session Securities Risk Av.
100816 A B (ai)
Subjects (#):
Type 1 (10) Varying Across 0.06
Type 2 (9) Periods 0.1
Securities:
Exp Payoff ($) 0.75 0.75
Pay Variance 1.0 0.5
Period 1:
Pay Covariance 0.2
Market (Units) 3.79 3.16
CAPM Price 0.42 0.58
Period 2:
Pay Covariance 0.2
Market (Units) 3.79 3.16
CAPM Price 0.42 0.58
Period 3:
Pay Covariance 0.2
Market (Units) 4 3
CAPM Price 0.41 0.58
Period 4:
Pay Covariance -0.25
Market (Units) 4.21 2.84
CAPM Price 0.49 0.72
Period 5:
Pay Covariance -0.25
Market (Units) 4.21 2.84
CAPM Price 0.49 0.72
Period 6
Pay Covariance -0.25
Market (Units) 4 3
CAPM Price 0.51 0.71
Session Securities Risk Av.
101118 A B (ai)
Subjects (#):
Type 1 (10) Varying Across 0.06
Type 2 (8) Periods 0.1
Securities:
Exp Payoff ($) 0.75 0.75
Pay Variance 1.0 0.5
Period 1:
Pay Covariance -0.4
Market (Units) 4 3
CAPM Price 0.55 0.76
Period 2:
Pay Covariance -0.4
Market (Units) 4.44 2.67
CAPM Price 0.50 0.78
Period 3:
Pay Covariance -0.4
Market (Units) 4.44 2.67
CAPM Price 0.50 0.78
Period 4:
Pay Covariance 0.4
Market (Units) 4 3
CAPM Price 0.37 0.52
Period 5:
Pay Covariance 0.4
Market (Units) 3.56 3.33
CAPM Price 0.39 0.52
Period 6
Pay Covariance 0.4
Market (Units) 3.56 3.33
CAPM Price 0.39 0.52
Sessions Securities Risk Av.
110608, 110609 A B (ai)
Subjects (#):
Type 1 (17) Varying Across 0.06
Type 2 (17) Periods 0.1
Securities:
Exp Payoff ($) 0.75 0.75
Pay Variance 1.0 0.5
Period 1:
Pay Covariance -0.4
Market (Units) 4 3
CAPM Price 0.54 0.76
Period 2:
Pay Covariance -0.4
Market (Units) 4 3
CAPM Price 0.54 0.76
Period 3:
Pay Covariance -0.4
Market (Units) 4 3
CAPM Price 0.54 0.76
Period 4:
Pay Covariance 0.4
Market (Units) 4 3
CAPM Price 0.36 0.52
Period 5:
Pay Covariance 0.4
Market (Units) 4 3
CAPM Price 0.36 0.52
Period 6
Pay Covariance 0.4
Market (Units) 4 3
CAPM Price 0.36 0.52
TABLE IV
Parameters: Sessions 5-9. All accounting was done in U.S. dollars.
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APPENDIX H: EXPERIMENTS: SAMPLE INSTRUCTIONS
H.1. Instructions: Session 110609 (Type 2 Subject)
 
Page 1 of 4 
Instructions 
 
Contents: 
 The Experiment 
 The Markets Interface, Flex-E-Markets 
 
 
 
I. The Experiment 
 
1. Situation 
 
The experiment consists of a number of replications of the same situation, referred to as 
periods. At the beginning of each period, you will be given securities and cash. Markets 
will open and you will be free to trade your securities. You buy securities with cash and 
you get cash if you sell securities. At the end of the period, the securities expire. They 
will pay dividends, which depend on how many securities you are holding at market 
close, and in which combination, as specified below.  
 
Your period earnings has two components: the dividends on the securities you are 
holding after markets close, plus your cash balance. 
 
Period earnings are cumulative across periods. There will be 12 periods in this 
experiment and each period lasts 5 minutes. You will be paid for twice of what you earn 
in 5 randomly pre-selected periods, which will be announced at the end of the 
experiment. The cumulative earnings are yours to keep, in addition to a standard $5 
sign-up reward. 
 
During the experiment, accounting is done in fake dollars. One fake dollar is worth 1 
U.S. cent. So, 100 fake dollars is worth 1 U.S. dollar. The symbol $ is used throughout 
to denominate fake dollars. 
 
2. The Securities 
 
You will be given two types of securities, stocks and bonds. Bonds pay a fixed dividend 
at the end of a period, namely, $100. Stocks pay dividends that depend on the number 
of units of each you are holding and in which combination.  
 
There are two stocks, A and B. At the beginning of each period, you will be given a look-
up dividend table that allows you to determine the dividends that are promised for each 
possible combination of holdings of A and B. An example of such a look-up table is 
reproduced here. 
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For instance, if you are holding 2 units of A and 3 units of B at market close, the 
dividends on this combination of A and B will amount to $357. Or if you’re holding none 
of A and 3 of B, the dividends will equal $203. If you’re finishing with 7 units of A and 4 
units of B, you’ll receive $652. 
 
Each period, the dividend table will be different. So, it is important that you pay careful 
attention to it before you start trading. 
 
Although this may be of little relevance to you, you may want to know that dividend 
tables will generally differ across market participants.  
 
 
 
II. The Markets Interface, Flex-E-Markets 
 
You trade through an electronic market interface called Flex-E-Markets. Navigate to 
http://filagora.caltech.edu/fm/ and enter the login ID and password you have been given 
at the beginning of the experiment. Then go to “Marketplace Access” and pick the 
appropriate Marketplace. You can enter marketplace “practice” and play with various 
functions of Flex-E-Markets while the instruction is read. 
 
61
 
Page 3 of 4 
 
 
Once you enter a marketplace, you will see slide bars for each market (Stocks A and B, 
and Bonds). The number of units of each security you have is displayed next to the 
market name. When choosing a bar, the order form will be populated. The price 
changes as you slide the ring on the bar. Use the order form to submit orders to buy, to 
sell, or to cancel previously entered orders. You can submit multiple orders at a 
particular price by changing the quantities in the order form. Submitted orders will show 
as red (if a sell order) or blue (if a buy order) tag on the slide bar. Along with your own 
orders, you will be able to see other participants’ orders, but you will not be told who 
submitted those.  
 
The orders you submit are limit orders. This means that, if they can be executed (i.e., if 
the system can find a counter party), you will be able to trade at the price you indicated, 
or at a better price. 
 
How you may be able to get a better price depends on the trading mechanism. During 
the experiment, we will alternate across periods between two trading mechanisms: the 
continuous markets and the call market. 
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• In the continuous market, Flex-E-Markets constantly tries to match incoming buy and 
sell orders. If a buy order arrives with a price at or above the highest possible price of 
a standing (i.e., previously entered) sell order, then the buy order trades with this best 
sell order, at the price of the sell order. Conversely, if a sell order arrives with a price 
at or below the highest possible price of a standing buy order, then the sell order 
trades with this best buy order, at the price of the buy order. If there are many “best” 
standing orders against which an arriving order can be executed, then Flex-E-Markets 
will choose the oldest standing order.  
• In the call market, limit orders are accumulated over time without Flex-E-Markets 
trying to match. Only at the end of the period will Flex-E-Markets execute orders. It 
does so by ranking orders by price and matching high price buy orders with low price 
sell orders until there are no more matches for which the buy price is at least as high 
as the sell price. All orders execute at the sell price of the last match or the buy price 
of the next (unexecuted) match, whichever is higher.  During order submission, flex-e-
markets will periodically compute provisional clearing prices and post them. The 
provisional clearing prices provide an indication of the level of prices at which trade 
would take place if flex-e-markets were to try to clear all standing orders.  
 
Your holding of a security is displayed above the corresponding slide bar. Your cash 
holding is displayed in the upper right hand corner.  
 
If you submit an offer to buy, you need to have enough cash.  
 
When you submit an offer to sell, you need to have enough securities.  
 
Still, we allow you to sell bonds (but not stock) that you don't own. This is called short 
selling. In that case, if the sale goes through, you end up with a negative position in the 
bonds, and, per unit, the dividend of the bond ($100) will be subtracted from your total 
pay at the end of the period. 
 
Because you need to have enough cash to buy, we generally start you out with lots of 
cash. Be careful: this cash is really “on loan,” because it will be offset with a short 
(negative) position in the bond.   
 
The Flex-E-Markets interface contains more functionality than described above (such as 
display of the list of orders or “books” in table format, or graphical display of incoming 
orders and past trades, etc.). Participants are invited to explore this functionality during 
the practice periods. None of it is crucial to successfully trade.   
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H.2. Snapshot of Online Trading Interface and Payoff Table: Session 020528
(Type 1 Subject)
MARKET SUMMARY ID: 123 Wed Sep 10 17:08:25 2003 Period 9 -Closed- RELOADCURRENT DATA
Market
Your
Units
Best Buy
Offer
Best Sell
Offer
Last
Trade
My
Offers
My
Trades Graph History
Notes 0 -@- -@- - -/-
SecurityA 2 -@- -@- - -/-
SecurityB 8 -@- -@- - -/-
Order Form
Buy Sell   Market: 
Units:    Price: 
Time to Expire:   0
(e.g. 1h6m5s; 0=never expire)
   Order       Clear
Your cash on hand is:
400 Home
Instructions and
Help Inventory
Graph of All
Markets
Payoff
Summary Announcements LOGOUT
Payoff From a and b
Payoff Summary
B Payoff
20 3958 4196 4433 4668 4902 5134 5365 5594 5822 6048 6273 6496 6718 6938 7157 7374 7590 7804 8017 8228 8438
19 3762 4000 4236 4471 4704 4936 5166 5395 5622 5848 6073 6295 6517 6736 6955 7172 7387 7601 7813 8024 8233
18 3566 3803 4039 4274 4506 4738 4968 5196 5423 5648 5872 6094 6315 6535 6752 6969 7184 7397 7609 7819 8028
17 3370 3607 3842 4076 4308 4539 4769 4996 5223 5448 5671 5893 6113 6332 6550 6766 6980 7193 7404 7614 7823
16 3173 3410 3645 3878 4110 4340 4569 4797 5023 5247 5470 5692 5912 6130 6347 6562 6776 6989 7200 7409 7617
15 2976 3212 3447 3680 3911 4141 4370 4597 4822 5046 5269 5490 5709 5927 6144 6359 6572 6784 6995 7204 7411
14 2779 3015 3249 3482 3713 3942 4170 4397 4622 4845 5067 5288 5507 5725 5941 6155 6368 6580 6790 6998 7205
13 2582 2817 3051 3283 3514 3743 3970 4196 4421 4644 4866 5086 5304 5522 5737 5951 6164 6375 6585 6793 6999
12 2385 2620 2853 3084 3314 3543 3770 3996 4220 4443 4664 4884 5102 5318 5533 5747 5959 6170 6379 6587 6793
11 2187 2421 2654 2885 3115 3343 3570 3795 4019 4241 4462 4681 4899 5115 5330 5543 5754 5965 6173 6381 6586
10 1990 2223 2456 2686 2916 3143 3370 3594 3818 4039 4260 4478 4696 4911 5126 5338 5550 5759 5968 6174 6380
9 1791 2025 2257 2487 2716 2943 3169 3393 3616 3837 4057 4275 4492 4707 4921 5133 5344 5554 5761 5968 6172
8 1593 1826 2057 2287 2516 2743 2968 3192 3414 3635 3854 4072 4288 4503 4717 4929 5139 5348 5555 5761 5965
7 1395 1627 1858 2088 2315 2542 2767 2990 3212 3432 3651 3869 4085 4299 4512 4723 4933 5142 5349 5554 5758
6 1196 1428 1659 1888 2115 2341 2565 2788 3010 3230 3448 3665 3881 4095 4307 4518 4727 4935 5142 5347 5550
5 997 1229 1459 1687 1914 2140 2364 2586 2807 3027 3245 3461 3676 3890 4102 4312 4521 4729 4935 5139 5342
4 798 1029 1259 1487 1714 1939 2162 2384 2605 2824 3041 3257 3472 3685 3897 4107 4315 4522 4728 4932 5134
3 599 830 1059 1286 1512 1737 1960 2182 2402 2620 2838 3053 3267 3480 3691 3901 4109 4315 4520 4724 4926
